Gary W. Jense v. Sara A. Jense : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Gary W. Jense v. Sara A. Jense : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Attorneys for Respondent: David S. Dolowitz; Cohne, Rappaport & Segal.
Attorneys for Appellant: Craig M. Peterson; E. Paul Wood; Littlefield & Peterson.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jense v. Jense, No. 880016 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/815
<• , -i •!. w o o r - .••'. i i 
AtfcOxine-yc fo r ''t.'f end-. .^t 
LITTLEFIKLH u PI-. "SRSON 
42t; ' jo.it1" v. e »:...: 







!•• "^P£ : A L S 
1 S . » . . . ' V G i \ 'i i i h : J ' I ' A '>'>J 
00G00--
GARY W. .TENSE, 
P1 ?».* n t i. t: t / Rospo i iden t , 
t/ .'A. J 
APPELLANT na*r,\? 
SARA -.. JIJNSE, 
s d - O C l o - . \ 
APPEAL vT*3M PfN 
Hh: liOWORABLE SO"'':';- PAN V !• 
QRDF.Rv ! i : J'JED BY 
I - . . : - . * • rtaCT COURT JUDGE 
n, . ) . ,o 
/> •: !;oi.*n-. 'V A o o e l 3 a n t : 
~ L O 1 -^ : n 
E . t ' a o l W< -od 
L i T T L E F l E1,D & t>K'i fiK^--»\T 
4 2 6 S o u t h f )00 E a s t 
S a l t La '« .i C i t y - ;-' t i h G 4 1 0 2 
T e l e p h o ' v : . '.M"i ' "• ' f 4 3 5 
Atto>*nt;yi.> Lot rt«.spend-..nit : 
D«v\/id S U o l o w i t z 
COI-LSIS, RAPPAPCRT & SEGAL, 
525 East J 00 South, Suite •500 
Salt l.aLe City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (001) r>'*/> -2226 
CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
E. PAUL WOOD - 3537 
Attorneys for Defendant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
OO0OO 
GARY W. JENSE, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
v. ) 
SARA A. JENSE, ) 
) Court of Appeals No. 88-0016-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Category 14(b) 
ooOoo 
APPEAL FROM FINAL ORDERS ISSUED BY 
THE HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ooOoo 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
Craig M. Peterson 
E. Paul Wood 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
David S. Dolowitz 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2226 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 2 
STATUTES AND RULES REQUIRED TO BE INTERPRETED 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 15 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION 17 
I. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND 
MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN MODIFYING THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 17 
A. Legal Standards of Review of Modification 
of Divorce Decrees 19 
B. The Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing 
to Follow Its Own Rules When Granting 
Modification of the Decree 21 
C. The Court Misapplied the Law When Finding 
That "Substantial Change in Circumstances" 
Occurred Warranting Modification 22 
D. The Court Misapplied the Law and Abused 
Its Discretion by Vacating the Judgment for 
Accrued and Unpaid Alimony 27 
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER SIGNED DECEMBER 7, 1987, ARE 
CONTRARY TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
ON THE ISSUE OF POSSESSION AND VALUE OF THE 
SILVERWARE 28 
A. Standard of Review and Findings of Fact 29 
B. The Decree of Divorce Awarded Mts. Jense 
the Silverware 29 
-i-
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED) 
P a9 e 
C. The Evidence Clearly Shows Mrs. Jense Was in 
Possession of the Silverware as of the Date 
of Decree 30 
D. The Evidence Clearly Establishes the Value 
of the Silverware at $4,417.50 31 
III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 32 
CONCLUSION 33 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147, 48 (Utah 1979) 27 
Boals v. Boals, 664 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1983) 19 
Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 57 (Utah 1983) 27 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-1223 
(Utah 1980) . . 19, 23 
Folger v. Fplger, 626 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981) 20, 26 
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977) 33 
Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374, 1376 (Utah 1980) 20, 25 
Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1975) 21 
Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980) 20, 25 
Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077, 79 (Utah 1977) 27 
Lembach v. Cox, 639 P. 2d 187 (Utah 1981) 33 
Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah, 1985) . . . . 20, 23 
Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981) 33 
-ii-
CASES CITED (CONTINUED) 
Page 
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 438 P.2d 180, 181 
(Utah, 1968) . . 21 
Sperry v. Smith, 694 P. 2d 581, 583 (Utah 1984) 22 
Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985). . . . 19, 20 
Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1982) 19 
Western Kane County Special Service District 
No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 1376, 
78 (Utah 1987) 29 
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). . . . 20 
STATUTES CITED 
Section 78-2a-3(g), Utah Code Ann. 
(effective January 1, 1988) 1 
-iii-
CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
E. PAUL WOOD - 3537 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
OOOoo 
GARY W. JENSE, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
v. ) 
SARA A. JENSE, ) 
) Court of Appeals No. 88-0016-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Category 14(b) 
ooOoo 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
This court has jurisdiction over the matter under 
Section 78-2a-3(g), Utah Code Ann, (effective January 1, 1988), 
in that it is an appeal from final orders in a divorce modifica-
tion proceeding. After hearing on January 14, 1986, the court 
entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
Divorce granting Appellant Mrs. Jense a divorce under her 
Counterclaim on July 9, 1986. On December 7, 1987, the court 
granted Mr. Jense1s "Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce" and 
"Motion" to setoff the amount of $10,000.00 against the divorce 
judgment. The court's Order modified the original Decree of 
Divorce without the benefit of discovery or an evidentiary 
hearing and vacated a subsequent judgment on the original Decree 
of Divorce obtained by appellant Mrs. Jense, April 1, 1987. The 
court's December 7, 1987, Order modifying the Decree of Divorce 
was entered over counsel for Mrs. Jense1s specific objections to 
the proceeding. The court, on December 8, 1987, additionally 
denied the Appellant's Motion for a New Trial filed on the basis 
of abuse of discretion, erroneous Findings of Fact and error in 
law under Rules 52 and 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The issues before this court flow from the August 24, 
1987, proceeding (final Order signed December 7, 1987), wherein 
the court granted the Plaintiff Mr. Jense's Motion to amend the 
Decree of Divorce which effected a modification of the original 
Decree without a full evidentiary hearing and granted Mr. Jense's 
Motion to setoff against Mrs. Jense's judgment against her hus-
band in an amount of $10,000.00. The issues presented for review 
are: 
1. That the court abused its discretion in granting 
Plaintiff's "Motion to Amend Decree" on August 24, 1987, by 
failing to comply with Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of 
Practice for the Third Judicial District Court (effective June 1, 
1987), when the court allowed no evidentiary hearing on the 
issues, further discovery, and proceeded on an Order to Show 
Cause basis. 
2. That the court abused its discretion by failing to 
grant Mrs. Jense's Motion for New Trial under Rules 52(b) and 59 
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after objections to the lack of evidentiary proceeding were 
entered during the hearing and after the hearing as constituting 
an abuse of discretion and error in law. 
3. That the court abused its discretion or misapplied 
the law in granting a modification of the Decree of Divorce 
entered July 9, 1986, and vacating the money judgment thereon 
entered April 1, 1987: 
A. The evidence presented failed to show a 
"substantial change in circumstances" relating to the property 
award, alimony and attorney's fee judgment sufficient to warrant 
modi fiation of each award; 
B. The court made an error in law by setting aside 
the judgment for accrued and unpaid alimony entered April 1, 
1987; 
C. The court erred by modifying the property award 
of $27,500.00 cash which at the time of the Decree "equalized the 
award of the marital estate" and replaced it with real property 
having no current equity. 
4. Where the Defendant presented specific unrebutted 
evidence by Affidavit of the value and her possession of silver-
ware at the time of the Decree of Divorce, which awarded each 
party the items of personal property in their possession, did the 
court err by: 
A. Signing an Order which did not reflect the pre-
ponderance of the evidence; 
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B. Setting off the value of the silverware against 
Mrs. Jense1s judgment in an amount equal to an estimate made by 
Mr. Jense. 
STATUTES AND RULES REQUIRED TO BE INTERPRETED 
This court will be required to interpret Rule 9 of the 
Supplementary Rules of Practice-Third Judicial District 
(effective June 1, 1987), which states: 
Rule 9. Modifications of Divorce Decrees. 
a. When a modification in the terms and con-
ditions of a Decree of Divorce is sought, the 
issue shall be raised by filing of a Petition for 
Modification and service of said Petition and 
Summons upon the opposing party in accordance with 
the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. No request for a change or a modifica-
tion of a Decree shall be raised by way of an Order 
to Show Cause. 
b. After a responsive pleading is filed, and 
discovery has been completed, counsel shall file a 
certificate of readiness for trial, and the matter 
shall then be heard by the assigned judge. 
c. No Petition for modification shall be 
placed on any law and motion or order to show cause 
calendar without the consent of the judge to whom 
the case is assigned. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 14, 1986, a divorce proceeding was held 
before the Honorable Scott Daniels, Third District Court Judge, 
on Mr. Jense's Complaint and Mrs. Jense1s Counterclaim for 
divorce. (January 14, 1986, Minute Entry, Record p. 85.) 
2. At the time of the hearing, the parties had been 
married 33 years, both were employed, their four children were 
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emancipated and they had accumulated significant real and per-
sonal property. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated 
July 9, 1986, Record, p. 108-15.) 
3. At the trial, each party submitted their proposed 
property distributions. Both Plaintiffs Exhibit P-2 and 
Defendant's Exhibit D-14 agreed that the parties' home located at 
9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, had a value of 
$150,000.00 and should be awarded to Mr. Jense; the equity in the 
property ranged from $41,000.00 to $47,926.00. (Exhibit P-2, 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A"; Exhibit D-14, attached hereto as 
Exhibit MB"; Record, p. 84.) 
4. On July 9, 1986, the Court entered Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce (respectively 
attached hereto as Exhibits "C" and "D"; Record, p. 108-15; p. 
123-29.) The pertinent provisions from the divorce Decree 
relating to the issues on appeal, state: 
"3. The real property of the parties is 
awarded as follows: 
"a. Plaintiff is awarded the equity of 
the parties in the house and real property at 9200 
North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to 
the mortgage liabilities outstanding thereon; the 
rental home at 582 West 850 North, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities 
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property; and 
the residence at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove, 
Utah, subject to Plaintiff assuming and paying the 
outstanding mortgage owing thereon. 
"b. Defendant is awarded the condominium 
at 29 South State Street, #718, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, subject to the mortgage outstanding thereon. 
"4. The personal property of the parties is 
awarded as follows: 
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"a. Plaintiff is awarded the Dasher auto-
mobile, the Cadillac automobile, the money in his 
checking account, and the furniture and furnishings and 
other items of personal property currently in his 
own possession except for the items specifically 
awarded to defendant as provided in the next 
following subparagraph. 
Mb. Defendant is awarded the Ford automo-
bile, her retirement, the money in her checking 
account, all the furniture and furnishings located 
in the condominium at 29 South State #718, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and the following items of fur-
niture and personal property located in the home 
occupied by plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah: Large antique copper frying 
pan; Antique church pew; French Provincial 
armchair; Nantucket rocking chair; Antique frame 
sampler; Hummel figurines; Bowl from Israel; Silver 
hurricane lamp; Small spinning wheel planter; 
Collection of antique spoons; Sterling silver 
goblets; Silver chafing dish; Antique cradle; 
Rocking chair; Bicentennial pewter plates; Poster 
bed; Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise 
Watts); Antique quilt/antique valentines; Antique 
quilt from defendant's grandmother; Moiri chair; 
cross-stitch quilt; Bowl and pitcher (gift from 
defendant's sister); Four Lladro figurines; Various 
Royal Doulton figures; Collection of "Coalport 
Cottages"; Defendant's clothing and personal 
effects, including personal papers and books and 
items which came from her family such as photograph 
albums, diaries and similar personal items. 
"7. In order to equalize the marital estate, 
defendant is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in 
the sum of $27,750 together with interest thereon 
at the legal rate of 12% from February 24, 1986, 
until paid in full. This obligation is ordered to 
be paid by plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, 
and until paid this obligation shall constitute a 
lien against plaintiff's real property located in 
Utah County as provided in paragraph 3a above. 
"9. No permanent alimony is awarded, but 
Plaintiff is ordered to pay Defendant temporary 
alimony in the amount of $500.00 per month for a 
period of one-year commencing with the month of 
March, 1986, with each installment due and payable 
on the 1st day of the month. 
"Because of plaintiff's current financial 
circumstances, however, defendant is ordered to 
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engage in no action to reduce these installments to 
judgment or enforce payment thereof through execu-
tion until April 1, 19S7, in order to allow plain-
tiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus 
for the 1986 income year. Each installment of ali-
mony shall bear interest from the date when due 
until paid at the rate of 10 percent per annum, and 
if by April 1, 1987, any installments have not been 
paid, then defendant shall be entitled to reduce 
any unpaid installments to judgment and enforce 
collection through execution. 
"10. Defendant is awarded a judgment for 
the use and benefit of her attorney in the amount 
of $5,000 plus costs including all appraisal costs 
incurred by defendant in this proceeding in the 
amount of $670. This obligation for attorney's 
fees and costs shall be due and payable by April 1, 
1987, and shall bear interest at the rate of 10 
percent per annum until paid. 
5. On April 1, 1987, the Court reduced to judgment the 
accrued amounts due and owing awarded under the divorce Decree 
for alimony, attorney's fees and property distribution which, 
with interest, equalled $43,314.46 (copies attached as Exhibit 
"E"; Record, p. 144-145; 160.) 
6. Mrs. Jense initiated collection by executing on 
Mr. Jense's car and garnishing his accounts (Record, p. 137-140; 
p. 161-162.) 
7. On April 6, 1987, the Court granted Mr. Jense's ex 
parte Motion to stay execution of the Judgment until April 14, 
1987, at which time a hearing would be held on the issue. The 
Motion was granted on the basis of Mr. Jense's Affidavit stating 
that he did not receive a bonus from his employment (Para. 5, 
Record, p. 154); and that he could not raise money to pay the 
judgment despite having placed the parties' home for sale (Paras. 
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6 and 9, Record, p. 155-156); (Order Staying Execution and Return 
of Property; Record, p. 146-149.) 
8. On April 14, 1987, the Court granted Mr. Jense's 
Motion to stay execution of the judgment for four months and 
granted Mrs. Jense $600.00 in attorney's fees. (Minute Entry, 
Record, p. 158; Transcript, April 14, 1987, p. 51, attached as 
Exhibit "F".) 
9. On June 24, 1987, Mr. Jense filed a "Motion" 
requesting the Court to set off against Mrs. Jense's $43,314.46 
Judgment, the amount of $10,000.00 on the basis that Mrs. Jense 
had obtained silverware after entry of the Decree of Divorce from 
a safety deposit box at Deseret Bank located in Pleasant Grove, 
Utah, which he assumed was awarded to him under the Decree of 
Divorce. ("Motion" and Affidavit in support attached as Exhibits 
"G" and "H"; Record, p. 167-168; p. 163-166.) Mr. Jense, in his 
Affidavit based his $10,000.00 estimate of valuation of the 
silverware on his own financial statement dated October 31, 1984, 
submitted to First Interstate Bank which he claimed was "prepared 
by Mrs. Jense." He offered no other basis for the valuation. 
Further, Mr. Jense simply stated that to his knowledge, the 
silverware had been maintained in the safety deposit box for an 
unspecified three-year period but made no other statement with 
respect to possession at the time of the Decree of Divorce. Mr. 
Jense's Affidavit regarding knowledge of possession of the 
silverware is contrary to the evidence in the record at the time 
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of the divorce proceeding.L 
10. The next most significant Motion over which this 
appeal arises was made by Mr. Jense on August 3, 1987. Plaintiff 
filed a "Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce" wherein Plaintiff 
moves the Court 
"...to amend the Decree of Divorce to delete 
payments due to the Defendant and vacate the 
judgment against the Plaintiff based on this change 
of circumstances and to order that any payments 
which the court order to be paid to the Defendant 
by Plaintiff be paid from proceeds of the sale of 
the parties1 home when sold." 
(Motion and Affidavit in Support, attached as Exhibits "I" and 
"L", respectively; Record, p. 169-71; 172-78.) 
11. Mr. Jense1s Affidavit in support of the Motion to 
Amend, in pertinent part states: 
"a. Mr. Jense has attempted to sell the 
Pleasant Grove home he was awarded for a period of 
six months without any success but estimates he 
will receive $119,000.00 as gross proceeds from the 
sale (paragraph 4); 
"b. His employment was terminated July 17, 
1987 (paragraph 6); 
ion May 29, 1985, in response to Plaintiff's 
Interrogatories, Mrs. Jense filed Answers with Exhibits. In 
response to No. 17 regarding safety deposit boxes, Mrs. Jense 
identifies the safety deposit box at Deseret Bank, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah, and states, "There are no items in the box and 
Plaintiff has the keys." (Answer attached as Exhibit "I".) In 
response to Interrogatory No. 7 to "describe all furniture, fix-
tures and appliances and household goods owned by you," Mrs. 
Jense filed "Attachment 2" to the Interrogatories with a four-
page itemization. The silverware is identified as being located 
in her condominium at 29 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. ("Attachment 2" attached as Exhibit "J".) 
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nc. Upon termination, he received $6,100.00 
(paragraph 7); and 
"d. Mr. Jense was employed by American Equity 
for 15 years where he annually received bonuses of 
$10,000-$72,000, but no bonus was paid during the 
calendar year 1987 (paragraph 9)." 
12. Plaintiff's counsel noticed up the "Motion" for 
setoff on the silverware and "Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce" 
for August 24# 1987 (Record, p. 179-80.) 
13. On August 21, 1987, Mrs. Jense filed a "Verified 
Reply to Plaintiff's Motion" with an attached Affidavit of Kay 
Jacobs, President, Deseret Bank and an itemization of the value 
of the silverware based upon retail prices for each piece (copies 
attached as Exhibit "M"; Record, p. 268-74). Mrs. Jense's 
Affidavit in pertinent part states: 
A. She was awarded the personal property in her 
possession by the Decree of Divorce dated July 9, 1986, then 
located in her condominium (Para. 1); 
B. The silverware had been located in her con-
dominium on July 9, 1986, and had been in her condominium since 
March, 1985 (Para. 2); 
C. Kay Jacobs, President, Deseret Bank, 
corroborates Mrs. Jense's statement in his Affidavit by stating 
that the bank records show the last entry to the safety deposit 
box was March 5, 1985; 
D. Mrs. Jense states that Mr. Jense was aware she 
maintained the silverware in her condominium and that it had only 
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been temporarily placed in the safety deposit box as a safety 
measure (Para. 3); and 
E. The value of the silverware was not $10,000.00 
as estimated by Plaintiff in his October 31, 1984, Financial 
Statement for First Interstate Bank, but was $4,417.50 based upon 
an itemized retail price for each piece of silverware (Para. 4, 
Exhibit "B" to Affidavit). 
14. On August 21, 1987, Defendant filed an "Answer to 
Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce" alleging the affirmative 
defense of res judicata and responding to the specific allega-
tions on the Motion to Amend (attached as Exhibit "N"; Record, p. 
265-274) . 
15. On August 24, 1987, the court held an abbreviated 
hearing on Mr. Jense's "Motions", at which time the Defendant's 
counsel consented to go forward with the hearing on the "Motion" 
for setoff on the basis of proffer of evidence and Affidavits but 
objected to consideration of the "Motion to Amend Decree of 
Divorce" stating: 
"If the court is genuinely interested and believes 
that there is a basis for consideration and modifi-
cation of a property distribution, then I think we 
have a right to a complete trial to open that 
issue, rather than this very short hearing and 
these proffers of counsel which is coming before 
the court today. (Transcript, p. 9, line 21, 
through p. 10, line 1.) 
"As I am saying (1) we don't believe there is suf-
ficient cause for even a consideration of change of 
property; but if there is, we believe we are 
entitled to complete trial on that issue.... 
(Transcript, p. 10, lines 12-15.) (Complete copy 
of Transcript of August 24, 1987, hearing attached 
as Exhibit "O".)" 
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16. Despite counsel's objections, the Court allowed no 
discovery on the issues, oral testimony by witnesses or other 
standard evidentiary proceeding required by Rule 9 of the 
Supplementary Rules of Practice of the Third District Court and 
granted Plaintiff's Motion on an Order to Show Cause basis. 
17. Mr. Jense's counsel tendered the proposed Order to 
Judge Daniels on September 24, 1987, (attached as Exhibit "P"; 
Record, p. 222-226; p. 260-264.) The Court's Order, which was 
subsequently signed December 7, 1987, modifies paragraphs 3, 4, 
7, 9, and 10 of the original Decree of Divorce and vacates the 
April 1, 1987, judgment for accrued alimony, court-ordered attor-
ney's fees and payment of $27,750.00 plus interest as property 
equalization. The "changed circumstances" identified in the 
Findings warranting this modification and vacating the judgment 
were: Mr. Jense did not receive a bonus in 1987; Mr. Jense was 
terminated from his employment in July, 1987; the selling price 
for the parties' home, rather than the appraisal price at the 
time of the Decree of Divorce of $150,000.00, was scheduled to be 
a net $119,000.00 (pp. 2-3, Exhibit "P", Record, 261, 262). (The 
home of the parties in Pleasant Grove, Utah, did not sell at that 
time, and there is an anticipated sale which will now produce a 
net of $4,000.00 to Mrs. Jense which the court has ordered will 
satisfy her $44,000.00 judgment.) The Findings of Fact further 
state: 
"The Defendant, between the time of the trial in 
this matter on January 14, 1986, and the entry of 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce on July 14, 1986, went to the bank where 
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the parties had stored their silverware and removed 
that silverware from the safety deposit box. The 
Plaintiff believed the silverware was worth 
$10,000.00 while the Defendant believed that it was 
worth approximately $4,500.00;" ("Order", p. 3, 
Exhibit "P"; Record, p. 262.) 
Based upon the change of circumstances, the court ordered: 
"A. The Decree of Divorce and all prior orders and 
judgments would be satisfied upon payment of the proceeds of the 
sale of the Pleasant Grove home to Mrs. Jense;" and 
"B. Mrs. Jense was awarded all right, title and 
interest to the silverware." ("Order", p. 4, Exhibit "P"; 
Record, p. 264). 
18. On November 5, 1987, Defendant filed her objections 
to the proposed Orders on the ground that: 
A. The Court unlawfully granted a modification of 
the Decree of Divorce without a full evidentiary hearing and over 
the Defendant's objections (para. 1, p. 3, Memorandum in Support 
of Objections; Record, p. 232); 
B. That the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
did not accurately reflect the court's ruling in the hearing or 
the language in the Decree of Divorce (pp. 4 and 5, Memo; Record, 
p. 233-34); 
C. That the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
did not accurately reflect the court's Order issuing from the 
April 14, 1987, proceeding (p. 6, Memo; Record, p. 235); 
D. That the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
did not reflect the evidence in the record regarding the 
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possession of the silverware at the time of the entry of Decree 
or its value (pp. 7 and 8, Memo; Record, p. 236-37). 
19. On November 5, 1987, counsel for Mrs. Jense filed a 
"Motion for a Trial" and Memorandum in support thereof, asserting 
that: 
A. The Court failed to follow Rule 9 of the 
Supplementary Rules of Practice when granting Mr. Jense1s Motion 
on an Order to Show Cause basis and that the court was obligated 
to grant a full evidentiary hearing on the alleged "changed cir-
cumstance" warranting a modification of the Decree (Point I, 
Memo, Record, p. 243); 
B. The Plaintiff failed to meet his burden in 
showing a substantial change in circumstances (Point II, 
Memorandum in support; Record, p. 244); and 
C. The court erred by modifying the alimony 
judgment which had been fully vested on April 1, 1987; (Point 
III, Memo; Record, p. 246). 
20. After hearing on December 1, 1987, Mrs. Jense's 
objections to the proposed Order were overruled and the Motion 
for New Trial denied. (Minute Entry, December 8, 1987, attached 
as Exhibit "Q"; Record, p. 254-55.) 
21. Judge Daniels signed the proposed Order December 7, 
1987 (Exhibit "P"; Record, p. 260-264.) 
22. Mrs. Jense filed this appeal regarding the Order of 
Modification of the Decree of Divorce issuing from the August 24, 
1987, hearing and the denial of her Motion for a New Trial. 
-14-
SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
1. On August 24, 1987, the court held a short pro-
ceeding on Mr. Jense's "Motion to Amend Decree" entered July 9, 
1986, and "Motion" to setoff against Mrs. Jense's divorce 
judgment. The Order issuing from the hearing was an abuse of 
discretion in that: 
A. The Court, after being advised of objections to 
the proceeding, failed to follow discovery and evidentiary 
hearing requirements of Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of 
Practice of the Third District Court; 
B. The Order modified the alimony, attorney's fees 
provision and property settlement of the July 9, 1986, Decree. 
The factors constituting a "change in circumstance," i.e. 
decrease in value of Mr. Jense's residence since the entry of the 
Decree, loss of job five weeks prior to the hearing and loss of 
bonus income for 1987, did not relate to the basis for making 
each award in the Decree, each were not "substantial and com-
pelling" changes of circumstance and ran only to the ability of 
Mr. Jense to pay the judgment. Modification of the Decree was, 
therefore, an abuse of discretion; 
C. Under Utah law, alimony becomes vested as it 
accrues and is not subject to modification. The trial court's 
order modified the alimony judgment which accrued as of April 1, 
1987, which is an abuse of discretion. 
2. The Findings of Fact and Order issuing from the 
August 24, 1987, hearing, should be set aside as not reflecting 
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the preponderance of the evidence. The intent of the original 
divorce Decree awarded Mrs. Jense all items of personal property 
located in her condominium. Mr. Jense filed a Motion to setoff 
the value of silverware which he claimed was awarded him# in an 
amount equal to $10,000.00. His Affidavit did not establish the 
location of the silverware and his assertion of value was based 
upon an estimate put on a financial statement he submitted 
October 31, 1984. Mrs. Jense submitted an Affidavit, which was 
corroborated by the president of the bank where the silverware 
was held, that she had obtained the silverware March 5, 1985, 
more than one year prior to entry of the Decree and had main-
tained it in her condominium since that date. Furthermore, Mr. 
Jense was aware of her possession of the silverware through 
Answers to Interrogatories provided by Mrs. Jense prior to trial. 
Mrs. Jense established the value of the silverware at $4,417.50 
by itemizing the retail price of each piece of silverware in her 
possession. The Order issuing from the Findings of Fact should 
be set aside in that the Order awarded Mrs. Jense silverware 
which was already in her possession under the Decree of Divorce 
and established its value at $10,000.00, which was setoff against 
Mrs. Jense's judgment. 
3. The Court abused its discretion by failing to grant 
Mrs. Jense1s Motion for a New Trial after having been informed of 
its failure to follow Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of 
Practice and its failure to enter Findings of Fact and issuing an 




The focus of this appeal is the August 24, 1987, hearing 
on Mr. Jense's "Motion to Amend Divorce Decree" and "Motion" for 
setoff against the judgment of the value of the silverware, and 
the post-hearing objections to the proposed Order and Motion for 
New Trial. This brief will state applicable legal standards by 
which the trial court's action should be reviewed and appropriate 
legal principles which should have been applied by the trial 
court in ruling on the Motions. Based upon these standards, it 
will be clear to this court that the trial court abused its 
discretion and misapplied applicable principles of law when 
entering its Order modifying the Decree of Divorce and setting 
off the value of the silverware against the Defendant's April 1, 
1987, Judgment. 
I. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND MISAPPLIED 
THE LAW IN MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The court's Order issuing from the August 24, 1987, pro-
ceeding modified paragraphs 3, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the original 
Decree. Paragraph 3 of the Decree awarded the home at 9200 North 
4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah, to Mr. Jense; paragraph 4 
awarded the items of personal property located in her condominium 
at 29 South State, #718, Salt Lake City, Utah; paragraph 7 states 
"in order to equalize the marital estate, the Defendant is 
awarded judgment from Plaintiff in the sum of $27,750.00 together 
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with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12 percent from 
February 24, 1986, until paid in full" which was ordered paid on 
or before April 1, 1987. Paragraph 9 awards temporary alimony in 
the amount of $500.00 per month for one year commencing March, 
1986, and the installments would be reduced to judgment or 
enforced through execution on April 1, 1987, "in order to allow 
Plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for the 1986 
income year." Paragraph 10 awards Mrs. Jense attorney's fees in 
the amount of $5,000.00, plus costs of $670.00 which is due and 
payable April 1, 1987, bearing interest at the rate of 10 percent 
per annum. Each of those separate awards were reduced to 
judgment April 1, 1987, in an amount equalling $43,416.46. The 
court's Order from the hearing modified each of those paragraphs 
in that it orders all judgments will be satisfied by payment of 
the proceeds of the sale of the Pleasant Grove home, and awards 
the silverware to Mrs. Jense and sets off the value thereof 
against the total judgment. Mrs. Jense will effectively end up 
with $4,000.00 from her $44,000.00 judgment and silverware which 
she has possessed for a year and three months prior to the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce. 
The "changed circumstances" alleged by Mr. Jense run 
solely to his ability to pay the judgment under the divorce 
Decree rendered July 9, 1986. (Emphasis added.) The alleged 
"changed circumstances" do not relate to the basis of the award 
for alimony, attorney's fees or "equalizing the marital estate." 
-18-
Under existing case law, the modification was a misapplication of 
law to facts and should be overturned. 
A. Legal Standards of Review of Modification of Divorce 
Decrees. 
The standards of review of trial courts' granting modifi-
cation of the Decree of Divorce is: "Defendant must show that 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the Findings of Fact 
or that the trial court has abused its discretion," Thompson v. 
Thompson, 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985), citing Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 198Q); Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 
6 (Utah 1982). Although the Fletcher case was a direct review of 
a divorce proceeding, the review of the rulings by an appellate 
court should apply the same legal standards. As stated in 
Fletcher, "On appeal, this Court will not disturb the action of 
the trial court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the 
contrary, or the trial court has abused its discretion or 
misapplied principles of law." Fletcher v. Fletcher, at p. 1222 
(citations omitted). 
Additionally, the reviewing Court has broad powers when 
reviewing modification orders. "Under prevailing standards of 
review, the appellate court may review both the facts and law of 
matters in equity, such as a request for modification of the 
Decree." Boals v. Boals, 664 P.2d 1191 (Utah 1983). 
A trial court must apply a variety of legal standards to 
the equitable proceeding when considering modification of a 
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divorce decree. Legal principles enunciated by the Utah Supreme 
Court which are applicable to the modification being reviewed by 
this court are: the movant has the burden to show a substantial 
change of circumstances since the Decree that was not originally 
contemplated within the Decree itself. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 
P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985); Thompson v. Thompson, supra., at p. 
362. The party seeking the modification must prove a substantial 
and permanent change of circumstances necessitating the modifica-
tion. Kiesel v. Kiesel# 619 P.2d 1374# 1376 (Utah 1980). 
Property division, as opposed to alimony and child support 
awards, are entitled to greater sanctity and modification should 
be granted "only upon a showing of compelling reasons arising 
from a substantial and material change in circumstances." Also, 
the change in circumstance must be "sufficiently radical" to 
justify modifying a property division. Folger v. Folger, 626 
P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1981). When a substantial change in cir-
cumstances is shown, the substantial change must relate to 
the basis upon which the original award was made by the trial 
court. Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah, 1985). 
Equity is not available to remedy a "bad bargain" entered into by 
a party based upon a request for modification. Land v. Land, 605 
P.2d 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980). Courts are required to give divorce 
Decrees final status accorded to any other civil judgment and 
apply their doctrine of res judicata where appropriate; the par-
ties are entitled to rely on the finality of alimony awards in 
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determining the right to receive and the duty to pay, 
Sorenson v. Sorenson, 438 P.2d 180, 181 (Utah, 1968); Klein v. 
Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 474 (Utah 1975). 
B. The Court Abused Its Discretion By Failing to Follow 
Its Own Rules When Granting Modification of the Decree. 
The trial court failed to follow the specific provisions 
of Rule 9 of the Supplementary Rules of Practice of the Third 
District Court (effective June 1, 1987) and thereby abused its 
discretion in granting Mr. Jense's "Motion to Amend Divorce 
Decree". Rule 9 requires that a formal Petition for modification 
be filed with the court and served on the party under Rule 4 of 
the Rules of Civil Procedure after which the Defendant has an 
opportunity to respond to the Petition and conduct formal disco-
very on the issues raised therein. Further, the rule specifi-
cally prohibits modification proceedings on an Order to Show 
Cause basis. 
The Motion to amend the Decree of Divorce was filed 
August 3, 1987, and the "Motion" for setoff was filed June 24, 
1987, with each Motion being noticed for hearing on August 24, 
1987 (Record, p. 179-180.) At the hearing, the trial court pro-
ceeded based on proffers and Affidavits on file, allowed no 
further discovery and no full evidentiary hearing on the modifi-
cation issues despite clear and strenuous objection from Mrs. 
Jense's counsel. (August 24, 1987, Transcript, pages 10 and 11.) 
Over Defendant's oral objections at the August 24, 1987, hearing 
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and further written objections to the nature and course of the 
proceeding filed November 5, 1987, the trial court entered its 
orders modifying the Decree of Divorce. The granting of the 
modification was a clear abuse of discretion, frustrating the 
clear intent of Third District Court rules. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that it is an abuse of 
discretion for a district court judge to fail to set aside an 
Order entered after the district court judge fails to follow the 
Supplementary Rules of Practice created in the district. 
Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1984). The court's 
error was pointed out by Mrs. Jense's counsel both during trial 
and by specific Memorandum filed November 5, 1987, yet the judge 
allowed the Order to stand. Entry of the Order on December 7, 
1987, was a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
C. The Court Misapplied the Law When Finding That 
"Substantial Change in Circumstances" Occurred Warranting 
Modificat ion. 
Although the court has broad discretion in determining 
what constitutes a change in circumstances warranting modifica-
tion, it is obligated to follow case precedence when deciding 
what factors are substantial and significant to warrant modifica-
tion. In this instance, the court failed to follow clear prece-
dence on the issues raised. 
Reviewing the three factual bases which were allegedly 
sufficient to constitute a "substantial change in circumstance" 
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shows that, for the most part, each "circumstance" does not 
relate to the basis upon which the award was made and, therefore, 
is insufficient to meet the "substantial change" burden. 
Mineer v. Mineer, supra. At most, the change in circumstance 
runs to Mr. Jense's ability to pay the awards one year after 
the original judgment is entered. In Mr. Jense's Affidavit sub-
mitted in support of the "Motion to Amend Decree of Divorce," he 
alleged the three bases upon which the property award, alimony 
award and attorney's fee award ought to be set aside were: On 
June 17, 1987, he lost his job (para. 6); he did not receive his 
annual bonus from his employer (para. 9); and the house which 
both parties valued at $150,000.00 at the time of the Decree of 
Divorce would sell for only $119,000.00 (para. 4). 
In reviewing the following Findings of Fact which are 
the basis of each of the separate awards in the Decree, the Court 
should keep in mind that the marital estate of the parties must 
be evaluated at the time of the Decree of Divorce and awards 
based upon the then-current values, assets and income. 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-1223 (Utah 1980). 
Finding of Fact No. 11 (Record, p. 105) regarding alimony states: 
"However, based upon the current financial cir-
cumstances of the parties, Plaintiff should pay to 
the Defendant temporary alimony in order to give 
Defendant the opportunity to establish herself...an 
amount of $500.00 per month for a period of one 
year...." 
The Finding of Fact continues: 
"Because of Plaintiff's current financial cir-
cumstances, however, Defendant should engage in no 
activity to reduce these installments to judgment 
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or enforce payment thereof through execution until 
April lf 1987, in order to allow Plaintiff an 
opportunity to receive his income bonus for 1986 
income year." 
The alimony award was subsequently reduced to judgment April 1# 
1987. 
Finding of Fact No. 12 (Record, p. 105# 106) regarding 
attorney's fees states: 
"In light of the disparity of the incomes and the 
current financial circumstances of the parties, the 
Plaintiff should be required to pay Defendant's 
attorney's fees in the amount of $5,000.00, 
together with all costs including appraisal costs 
incurred by the Defendant in the sum of $670.00. 
The obligation for attorney's fees and costs should 
be due and payable April 1, 1987...." 
The attorney's fees award was reduced to judgment April 1, 1987. 
Finding of Fact No. 9 (Record, p. 104) regarding the 
property award of the marital estate, states: 
"In order to equalize the marital estate, Defendant 
should be awarded a judgment from Plaintiff in the 
sum of $27,750.00 with interest thereon at the 
legal rate of 12 percent from February 24, 1986, 
until paid in full. This obligation should be paid 
by Plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and until 
paid, this obligation should constitute a lien 
against Plaintiff's real property located in Utah 
County..." 
This award was also again reduced to judgment April 1, 1987. 
Reviewing each "changed circumstance" as it relates to 
the basis for each award clearly reveals the court's erroneous 
determination of a "substantial change in circumstance" 
warranting modification. 
(1) Job loss, July 17, 1987: First of all, the 
job loss is temporary in nature and should not warrant modifica-
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tion of any of the three separate awards. Kiesel v. Kiesel, 
supra. The Affidavit of Mr. Jense was executed two weeks after 
the job loss. The court made no further inquiry into his ability 
to obtain a job or his prospects and allowed Defendant no oppor-
tunity for discovery on the issue. Further, the job loss 
occurred three months after the due date for payment of alimony, 
attorney's fees and the equalized property distribution. 
The alimony award was based upon "need" at the time of the Decree 
of Divorce, the attorney's fees was based upon "disparity of 
income" at the time of the Decree of Divorce and the property 
distribution was based on an evaluation of the then-existing 
value of the assets and not Mr. Jense's income. 
(2) Decrease in value of the home from $150,000.00 
to $119,000.00: Initially, it must be pointed out that both Mr. 
and Mrs. Jense agreed on the value of $150,000.00 for the 
Pleasant Grove home and agreed that the Plaintiff should receive 
it (Exhibits P-2 and D-14, attached as Exhibits "A" and "B"). 
Mr. Jense received precisely what he bargained for which turned 
out to be not as good an investment as he anticipated at the time 
of the Decree. He is essentially asking the court to overturn a 
bad bargain which he made which, under the principles of equity 
of modification, is not an acceptable "changed circumstance." 
Land v. Land, supra. The decrease in value of the asset does not 
relate to the court's Findings of Fact regarding the award of 
alimony, attorney's fees or property distribution. Further, it 
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must be noted that Mr. Jense did little, if anything, to sell 
the Pleasant Grove home until March, 1987, for a period of nine 
months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. He clearly 
contributed to the problem by failing to act to liquidate the 
asset. This is especially true when he must have known that his 
employer was experiencing financial difficulties and he could not 
anticipate the bonus for 1987. 
(3) Failure to receive 1987 bonus; Mr. Jense's 
failure to receive his annual bonus is a circumstance which does 
not relate to the basis of the $27,750.00 property award. As 
stated in the Findings of Fact, the award was made "to equalize 
the assets of the parties" and did not relate to Mr. Jense1s 
income. Not receiving the bonus also does not relate to the ali-
mony award (need of Mrs. Jense as of July 9, 1987, for a twelve-
month period) or the award of attorney's fees ("based upon 
current disparity of income of the parties"). The fact that Mr. 
Jense did not receive the bonus simply impaired his ability to 
make the payment due on April 1, 1987, but did not justify 
entirely setting aside each of the awards. It is not the kind of 
"compelling circumstances" justifying setting aside the entire 
property award as envisioned in Folger, supra. 
In summation, on the surface, the loss of job, decrease 
in value of the home and lack of bonus creates a somewhat 
appealing case for "substantial change in circumstance." 
However, when reviewed in the light of how each of those factors 
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relates to the basis for each award, it is clear that it does not 
justify abrogating alimony, attorney's fees and a property award 
on a permanent basis. The awards which were made by the court on 
July 9, 1986, and were due and payable April 1, 1987, were 
inappropriately modified by misapplication of law to the facts. 
D. The Court Misapplied the Law and Abused Its 
Discretion by Vacating the Judgment for Accrued and Unpaid 
Alimony. 
The court's December 7, 1987, Order effectively vacated 
the alimony judgment which had accrued for twelve months as of 
April 1, 1987, and was reduced to judgment in the amount of 
$5,549.80 (Record, p. 160). The Utah Supreme Court has been une-
quivocal on the point. "In this jurisdiction, alimony and sup-
port payments become unalterable debts as they accrue; therefore, 
a periodic installment cannot be changed or modified after the 
installments have become due." Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077, 
79 (Utah 1977). "Installments of support payments ordered in a 
divorce decree become vested in the recipient when they become 
due." (Citations omitted,) Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155, 57 
(Utah 1983). "Installments of support money vest as they become 
due." (Citation omitted.) "The court has no power to modify the 
Decree as to these vested rights, unless it finds that each ele-
ment of equitable estoppel applies." Adams v. Adams, 593 
P.2d 147, 48 (Utah 1979). 
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II. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER SIGNED DECEMBER 7, 1987, 
ARE CONTRARY TO THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
ON THE ISSUE OF POSSESSION AND VALUE OF THE SILVERWARE 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and court's 
Order, simply do not reflect the evidence in the record on the 
issues of possession and value of silverware. With regard to the 
silverware, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law state: 
"In addition, the Defendant, between the time of the 
trial of this matter on January 14, 1986, and the 
entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree on July 14, 1986, went to the bank where 
the parties had stored their silverware and removed 
that silverware from the safety deposit box. The 
Plaintiff believed that the silverware was worth 
$10,000.00 while the Defendant believed that it was 
worth approximately $4,500.00." 
The "removal" of the silverware from the safety deposit box was 
then used as a basis to modify the Decree of Divorce in that it 
constituted a 
"Substantial change of circumstance in that the 
intent of the Court has been thwarted by events 
resulting in the Defendant being awarded more than 
one-half of the marital estate which requires, in 
equity, a modification of the Decree and prior orders 
and judgments of the Court, which, even after the 
modification, results, the Court believes, in the 
Defendant being awarded more than one-half of the 
estate of the parties, thus, the court must modify 
the Decree of Divorce and prior orders and 
judgments of this court to provide that the 
Defendant be awarded the silverware that she has 
removed from the bank deposit box and taken into 
her possession and the net proceeds of the sale of 
the home of the parties and that upon payment to 
her of the net proceeds of sale, that all prior 
awards, judgments and Orders of the court requiring 
payment to her should be deemed satisfied and paid 
in full." (Record, p. 224, 225.) 
The Court then files its Order: 
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2. The Defendant is awarded all right, title 
and interest of the parties to the silverware that 
she has removed from the safety deposit box of the 
parties during the pendency of the action. 
(Record, p. 225.) 
A. Standard of Review and Findings of Fact, Referring 
to Rule 52(a) regarding the court's findings, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that the content of Subdivision (a)'s "clearly 
erroneous" standard imported from the federal rule, requires that 
if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, or 
if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm con-
viction that a mistake has been made, the findings will be set 
aside. Western Kane County Special Service District No. 1 v. 
Jackson Cattle Company, 744 P.2d 1376, 78 (Utah 1987). 
B. The Decree of Divorce Awarded Mrs. Jense the 
Silverware. 
At paragraph 4 of the Divorce Decree, the Court awards 
personal property as follows: 
"A. Plaintiff is awarded the Dasher automo-
bile, the Cadillac automobile, the money in his 
checking account and the furniture and furnishings 
and other items of personal property currently in 
his own possession except for the items specifi-
cally awarded to the Defendant as provided in the 
next following subparagraph. 
"B. Defendant is awarded the Ford automobile, 
her retirement, the money in her checking account, 
all the furniture and furnishings located in the 
condominium at 29 South State Street, #718, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and the following items of fur-
niture and personal property currently located in 
the home occupied by the Plaintiff at 9200 North 
4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah:" (Items deleted.) 
Although the personal property provision does not make a 
specific award of the silverware to Mrs. Jense, the award con-
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templates that she will receive all items which are then in her 
possession in her condominium at 29 South State Street, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. With regard to possession as of the date of Decree, 
the evidence is unequivocal and it is clear from Mrs. Jense's 
Affidavit and her Answers to Interrogatories that he knows she 
was in possession of the silverware. 
C. The Evidence Clearly Shows Mrs. Jense Was in 
Possession of the Silverware as of the Date of Decree. 
The evidence before the Court on the issue of possession 
of the silverware consisted of Mr. Jense's Affidavit (Record, 
p. 163-165, attached hereto as Exhibit H, and Mrs. Jense's 
Affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit "M", Record, p. 268-274.) 
Mr. Jense's Affidavit is totally silent as to the location of the 
silverware as of July 9, 1986, on the date of the Decree, what 
dates the silverware was located in the safety deposit box (other 
than a vague three-year period), or the basis upon which he would 
assert possession of the silverware as of the date of the Decree 
of Divorce since he apparently assumed it was in the safety depo-
sit box and "the Defendant was in charge of transferring the 
silver from the home to the safety deposit box." 
In contrast, the Plaintiff's "Verified Response" and the 
Affidavit of Kay Jacobs, president of Deseret Bank where the 
safety deposit box was located, unequivocally establish: That on 
July 9, 1986, the silverware was located in Mrs. Jense' con-
dominium (para. 2). She removed the silverware from the safety 
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deposit box in March, 1985, and took it to her condominium; Kay 
Jacobs testifies that the records of the bank show that the last 
entry into the safety deposit box was March 5, 1985; and that the 
silverware had been stored in the safety deposit box for only a 
short period of time and that both Mr. and Mrs. Jense knew and 
understood the silverware was the property of the Defendant 
having been acquired prior to her marriage (para. 3). (Also, see 
Mrs. Jense's Answer to Interrogatories, Exhibits "I" and "J" 
hereto regarding location of silverware as of May 24, 1985.) 
The Findings of Fact are absolutely contrary to the pre-
ponderance of the evidence as to possession on the date of 
Decree, possession prior to the date of Decree, and date of remo-
val from the safety deposit box. 
D. The Evidence Clearly Establishes the Value of the 
Silverware at $4,417.50. 
The only evidence before the court on the issue of value 
was again the Affidavits of the parties. Mr. Jense1s Affidavit 
at paragraph 6 values the silverware at "approximately 
$10,000.00." However, this is based upon his own financial 
statement submitted to First Interstate Bank on October 31, 1984, 
which he alleged was "prepared by the Defendant" (Exhibit "H"; 
Record, p. 163-166). He further acknowledges that "Plaintiff is 
unable to determine the exact pieces in the safety deposit box." 
(Para. 6.) Mrs. Jense, in her Affidavit, at para. 4 states the 
silverware is valued at $4,417.50 (Exhibit "M"; Record, p. 
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268-274.) This is based upon her itemization attached as 
Exhibit "B" of each piece of silver and the retail price therefor 
based upon the then-current suggested retail price taken from 
the mail order price of "The Yankee Merchant Group and James 
Kaplan Jewelers." 
The Findings of Fact are erroneous in that they reflect 
a $10,000.00 value on the silverware by the court in setting off 
that value against that judgment of $43,417.46 awarded Mrs. 
Jense. 
This court should set aside the Findings of Fact on the 
issues and the Order based thereon, especially where it was the 
intent of the Order that Mrs. Jense receive those items of per-
sonal property located in her condominium on July 9, 1986. 
III. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Mrs. Jense1s Motion for New Trial, pursuant to Rules 52 
and 59 was prima facie well founded. The Motions were made 
November 5, 1987, after Mrs. Jense1s counsel belatedly received 
the transcript from the hearing of April 14, 1987 (See 
Introduction to Objection to Proposed Order and Motion for Trial, 
Record, p. 227.) Within the body of the Memoranda in Support of 
New Trial and Objections to the Proposed Findings and Order, 
counsel for the Defendant clearly explicated the legal proposi-
tions that the court had failed to follow Rule 9 of the 
Supplementary Rules of Practice of the Third District Court 
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thereby abusing its discretion (Point I, Memorandum, Record, p. 
243-44); that there was not a substantial change in circumstance 
warranting modification (Point II, Memorandum, Record, p. 
244-45); and that the alimony award could not be set aside after 
it had become vested April 1, 1987 (Point III, Memorandum, 
Record, p. 246-47), The Memorandum in support of the Objections 
to the proposed Order also clearly explicated the reason why the 
Findings of Fact did not reflect the preponderance of the evi-
dence (see generally, Memorandum, Record, p. 239-47). The 
court, after review of the specific bases for a new trial should 
have granted Mrs. Jense's Motion under Rule 59(a)(1) ("abuse of 
discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair 
trial"), §(a)(6) ("insufficiency of evidence to justify the ver-
dict or other decision, or that it is against law"); and/or 
§(a)(7) ("error in law"). 
Where the trial court's Order denying a Motion for a new 
trial is a "clear abuse of discretion," the reviewing court 
should reverse the trial court and remand for a new trial. 
Jensen v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977); Lembach v. Cox, 
639 P.2d 187 (Utah 1981); Schmidt v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's failure to follow Rule 9 of the 
District Rules of Practice in and of itself justifies setting 
aside the modification Order as an abuse of discretion which pre-
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vented normal and required response and discovery on the issues 
presented, and an adequate hearing. In addition, the Affidavit 
and proffer of evidence presented at the August 24, 1987, 
hearing, did not show a "substantial and compelling change in 
circumstance" warranting abrogating the alimony, attorney's fees 
and property award made to Mrs. Jense by the July 9, 1986, Decree 
of Divorce. It is further abundantly clear that the case law 
establishes setting aside an accrued and vested alimony award is 
an abuse of discretion. This court should now rectify the errors 
of the trial court by setting aside the court's Order of modifi-
cation and setoff and remanding with instructions to reinstate 
the judgment and for a new trial on all the issues, or in the 
alternative, reinstating the Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this C( d aY o f June, 1988. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
By: 
\r\r\r\ ' E.7PAUL WOOD 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to 
David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent, COHNE, 
RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, 525 East 100 South, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, 




GARY W. JENSE V. SARA A. JENSE 
Proposed Distribution of Assets and Liabilities 
Description 
*9200 North 4650 West 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 
(Value $150,000 less mtgs. of 
$109,000) 
29 South State, #178 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(Value $39,000 less mtg. of 
$33,740) 
582 West 850 North 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 










Zions Checking (H) 
First Security Checking (W) 
TOTAL ASSETS: 
LIABILITIES (See attached sheet) 
Payment to defendant for 
cash-out value 













$ 17 ,493 





$ 2 0 , 2 6 0 




•Mortgage fluctuates because of revolving line of credit 
52861 
EXHIBIT A 
EXHIBIT " B " 
PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES 
GARY AND SARA JENSE 
Assets Sara Gary 
9200 No. 4650 West, Pleasant Grove 
(Judd Harward appraisal $150,000 
less mortgages Prudential $33,743; 
Beneficial Finance $46,951; 
Beneficial Revolving Credit $21,380. $ 47,926 
Values from Plntf. Int. Ans. #12) 
29 South State #718, Salt Lake City 
(Webber appraisal $39,000 less 
mortgage $32,738) $ 6,262 
582 West 850 North, Pleasant Grove 
(Rental property; Harward appraisal 
$57,000 less mortgages GE $26,900; 
Fox $20,000. Plntf. Int. Ans. #12) 10,100 
45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove 
(Value $52,000 less mortgage $32,956; 
property received by plaintiff 
from father) -0-
Tibble Fork, Utah County 
(Value $60,000; property received 
from plaintiff's father) -0-
Furniture, Pleasant Grove Gifted 28,555 
(See list) 
Furniture, Salt Lake City 3,185 
1980 Dasher (value from plaintifffs 3,000 
interrogatory answers) 
1984 Cadillac ($22,800 value 
purchased with $24,179 check out 
of 1984 bonus) -0-
1980 Ford (value from plaintiff's 3,000 
interrogatory answers) 
Zion's checking (plaintiff's 
financial declaration) 2,000 
First Security checking 2,000 
Federal retirement ($3,600 dovetails 
with Social Security) 
EXHIB 
Assets Sara Gary 
1985 Bonus (Gross bonus $85,000; 
net paid $70,304) 
1986 bonus currently earned 
to be paid in March, 1986 
Proceeds, sale of stock 
T-Bond futures (date of sale 
5/11/84 for $60,002) 
Loss carryover of $20,100 
assuming tax liability of 50% 
Liabilities: 
Student loan liability 
($25,175 less prats $5,468) 
Installment obligations 
(See exhibit of expenses) 
Zion's Bank loan (fin. decl.) 











Payment by plaintiff to 






4/J7 (-M.O f0 0* 




B. L. DART (818)
 H ^&/ , r' 
Attorney for Defendant t- Jx?w A 
Suite 1330 ' *~ '-"' 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
GARY W. JENSE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SARA A. JENSE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D85-702 
Judge Daniels 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 14th day of January, 1986, plaintiff appearing in person 
and by his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and each of the 
parties having testified to matters in their respective complaint 
and counterclaim and the matter having been argued and submitted 
and taken under advisement by the Court, and the Court now being 
fully advised hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1, Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, and has been for more than three months immediately 
prior to the filing of this action for divorce. 
EXHIBIT C 
2. Plaintiff and defendant were married in Las Vegas, 
Nevada on the 10th day of January, 1953, and since that time have 
been husband and wife. 
3. Plaintiff has treated defendant cruelly, causing 
her great mental suffering and distress. Among other things, 
plaintiff has failed to meet defendant's emotional needs and 
include her in the financial decisions of the marriage, which 
conduct has made it impossible for defendant to continue with the 
marriage relationship and entitles defendant to a decree of 
divorce from plaintiff on her counterclaim. 
4. Plaintiff and defendant have four children as 
issue of this marriage, all of whom are adults and emancipated, 
and there are no issues of custody or support. 
5. The real property of the parties should be awarded 
as follows: 
a. Plaintiff should be awarded the equity of the 
parties in the house and real property at 9200 North 4650 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities 
outstanding thereon; the rental home at 582 West 850 North, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities 
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property and the residence 
at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to plaintiff 
assuming and paying the outstanding mortgage owing thereon. 
b. Defendant should be awarded the condominium 
at 29 South State Street #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to 
2 
the mortgage outstanding thereon. 
6. The personal property of the parties should be 
awarded as follows: 
a. Plaintiff should be awarded the Dasher 
automobile, the Cadillac automobile, the money in his checking 
account, and the furniture and furnishings and other items of 
personal property currently in his own possession except for the 
items specifically awarded to defendant as provided in the next 
following subparagraph. 
b. Defendant should be awarded the Ford 
automobile, her retirement, the money in her checking account, 
all the furniture and furnishings located in the condominium at 
29 South State #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the following 
items of furniture and personal property currently located in the 
home occupied by plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant 
Grove, Utah: 
Large antique copper frying pan 
Antique church pew 
French Provincial armchair 
Nantucket rocking chair 
Antique frame sampler 
Hummel figurines 
Bowl from Israel 
Silver hurricane lamp 
3 
Small spinning wheel planter 
Collection of antique spoons 
Sterling silver goblets 
Silver chafing dish 
Antique cradle 
Rocking chair 
Bicentennial pewter plates 
Poster bed 
Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise 
Watts) 
Antique quilt/antique valentines 
Antique quilt from defendant's grandmother 
Moiri chair 
Cross-stitch quilt 
Bowl and pitcher (gift from defendant's 
sister) 
Four Lladro figurines 
Various Royal Doulton figurines 
Collection of "Coalport Cottages" 
Defendant's clothing and personal effects, 
including personal papers, books and items 
which came from her family such as photograph 
albums, diaries and similar personal items. 
7. The parties should agree upon a time when defendant 
can receive from plaintiff the items of property to be awarded to 
defendant which are currently in plaintiff's possession, which 
4 
time should be consistent with the schedule of the daughter of 
the parties who is to arrange to pick up the items for defendant. 
8. The obligations and liabilities of the parties 
should be assumed and paid as follows: 
a. Plaintiff should assume and pay the 
various mortgage obligations owing on the real properties awarded 
to him, the Zion's First National Bank note liability shown on 
plaintiff's Exhibit P-l, any income tax liability for his 1985 
income, and any obligations which he has individually incurred 
since the separation of the parties in June, 1984. 
b. Defendant should assume and pay her student 
loan, her installment obligations, and any obligations which she 
has individually incurred since the separation of the parties in 
June, 1984. 
9. In order to equalize the marital estate, defendant 
should be awarded a judgment from plaintiff in the sura of $27,750 
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% from February 24, 
1986, until paid in full. This obligation should be paid by 
plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and until paid this 
obligation should constitute a lien against plaintiff's real 
property located in Utah County as provided in paragraph 5a above. 
10. As an alimony award from plaintiff to defendant, 
plaintiff should pay defendant an amount equal to one-half of the 
gross bonus earned by plaintiff in 1985 which will be received in 
5 
1986, and upon receipt of the bonus, one-half of the gross bonus 
should be paid to defendant. 
11. The Court finds that defendant based upon her 
current employment is capable of supporting herself and for this 
reason, the Court does not award permanent alimony. However, 
based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties, 
plaintiff should pay to defendant temporary alimony in order to 
give defendant the opportunity to establish herself, which 
alimony should be in the amount of $500 per month for a period of 
one-year commencing with the month of March, 1986, and with each 
installment to be due and payable on the 1st day of the month. 
Because of plaintiff's current financial 
circumstances, however, defendant should engage in no action to 
reduce these installments to judgment or enforce payment thereof 
through execution until April 1, 1987, in order to allow 
plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for the 1986 
income year. Each installment of alimony should bear interest 
from the date when due until paid at the rate of 10% per annum, 
and if by April 1, 1987 any installments have not been paid, then 
defendant should be entitled to reduce any unpaid installments to 
judgment and enforce collection through execution. 
12. In light of the disparity of the incomes and the 
current financial circumstances of the parties, plaintiff should 
be required to pay defendant's attorney's fees in the amount of 
$5,000 together with all costs including appraisal costs incurred 
6 
by defendant in the sum of $670. The obligation for attorney's 
fees and costs should be due and payable by April 1, 1987 and 
shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum until paid. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant is entitled to a divorce from plaintiff 
on the grounds of mental cruelty, which decree shall be final 
upon signing and entry. 
2. The real property of the parties is awarded as 
provided in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact. 
3. The personal property of the parties is awarded as 
provided in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact. 
4. The liabilities of the parties are to be assumed 
and paid as provided in paragraph 8 of the Findings of Fact. 
5. Defendant is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in 
the amount of $27,750 as property settlement to equalize the 
marital estate plus interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% per 
annum from February 24, 1986, until paid in full, with payment to 
be made upon the terms and to be secured as provided in paragraph 
9 of the Findings of Fact. 
6. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant an 
alimony award equal to one-half of the gross bonus earned by 
plaintiff in 1985 which will be received in 1986, and upon 
7 
receipt of the bonus, plaintiff is ordered to pay one-half of the 
gross bonus to defendant. 
7. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to defendant temporary 
alimony in the amount of $500 per month for a period of one-year 
commencing with the month of March, 1986, to be paid upon the 
terms provided in paragraph 11 of the Findings of Fact. 
8. Defendant is awarded a judgment for the use and 
benefit of her attorney in the amount of $5,000 together with 
costs in the amount of $670 incurred by defendant in this 
divorce proceeding, to be paid upon the terms provided in 
paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact. 
9. Each of the parties is ordered to execute any 
documents necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce when it is entered. 
DATED this &\ day of \J -» V l/ > 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
By WJ^~1^ 
9 / DISTRICT JUDGE 
!>W**HIIAIL,ING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of , 1986, 
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law to: 
David S. Dolowitz 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 




B. L. DART (818) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Suite 1330 
310 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo ;>£ £0% ^C' ,0^f 
GARY W. JENSE, : "7 ~ M - £fe /£• '. ^8 ^ ^ 
Plaintiff, : 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v. : 
SARA A. JENSE, : Civil No. D85-702 
Defendant. : Judge Daniels 
oooOooo 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on the 14th day of January, 1986, plaintiff appearing in person 
and by his attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appearing 
in person and by her attorney, B. L. Dart, and each of the 
parties having testified to matters in their respective complaint 
and counterclaim and the matter having been argued and submitted 
and taken under advisement by the Court, and the Court having 





IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant is awarded a decree of divorce from 
plaintiff on the grounds of mental cruelty, which decree for good 
cause shown shall be final upon signing and entry, 
2. Plaintiff and defendant have four children as 
issue of this marriage, all of whom are adults and emancipated, 
and there are no issues of custody or support. 
3. The real property of the parties is awarded 
as follows: 
a. Plaintiff is awarded the equity of the 
parties in the house and real property at 9200 North 4650 West, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities 
outstanding thereon; the rental home at 582 West 850 North, 
Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to the mortgage liabilities 
outstanding thereon; the Tibbie Fork property; and the residence 
at 45 East 100 North, Pleasant Grove, Utah, subject to plaintiff 
assuming and paying the outstanding mortgage owing thereon. 
b. Defendant is awarded the condominium 
at 29 South State Street #718, Salt Lake City, Utah, subject to 
the mortgage outstanding thereon. 
4. The personal property of the parties is awarded as 
follows: 
a. Plaintiff is awarded the Dasher automobile, 
the Cadillac automobile, the money in his checking account, and 
2 
the furniture and furnishings and other items of personal 
property currently in his own possession except for the items 
specifically awarded to defendant as provided in the next 
following subparagraph. 
b. Defendant is awarded the Ford automobile, her 
retirement, the money in her checking account, all the furniture 
and furnishings located in the condominium at 29 South State 
#718, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the following items of furniture 
and personal property currently located in the home occupied by 
plaintiff at 9200 North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah: 
Large antique copper frying pan 
Antique church pew 
French Provincial armchair 
Nantucket rocking chair 
Antique frame sampler 
Hummel figurines 
Bowl from Israel 
Silver hurricane lamp 
Small spinning wheel planter 
Collection of antique spoons 
Sterling silver goblets 




Bicentennial pewter plates 
Poster bed 
Bowl and pitcher (gift from Aunt Louise 
Watts) 
Antique quilt/antique valentines 
Antique quilt from defendant's grandmother 
Moiri chair 
Cross-stitch quilt 
Bowl and pitcher (gift from defendant's 
sister) 
Four Lladro figurines 
Various Royal Doulton figurines 
Collection of "Coalport Cottages" 
Defendant's clothing and personal effects, 
including personal papers and books and items 
which came from her family such as photograph 
albums, diaries and similar personal items. 
5. The parties are ordered to agree upon a time when 
defendant can receive from plaintiff the items of property to be 
awarded to defendant which are currently in plaintiff's 
possession, which time should be consistent with the schedule of 
the daughter of the parties who shall arrange to pick up the 
items for defendant. 
6. The obligations and liabilities of the parties 
are to be assumed and paid as follows: 
4 
a. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the 
various mortgage obligations owing on the real properties awarded 
to him, the Zion's First National Bank note liability shown on 
plaintiff's Exhibit P-l, any income tax liability for his 1985 
income, and any obligations which he has individually incurred 
since the separation of the parties in June, 1984. 
b. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay her 
student loan, her installment obligations, and any obligations 
which she has individually incurred since the separation of the 
parties in June, 1984. 
7. In order to equalize the marital estate, defendant 
is awarded a judgment from plaintiff in the sum of $27,750 
together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12% from 
February 24, 1986, until paid in full. This obligation is 
ordered to be paid by plaintiff on or before April 1, 1987, and 
until paid this obligation shall constitute a lien against 
plaintiff's real property located in Utah County as provided in 
paragraph 3a above. 
8. As an alimony award from plaintiff to defendant, 
plaintiff is ordered to pay defendant an amount equal to one-half 
of the gross bonus earned by plaintiff in 1985 which will be 
received in 1986, and upon receipt of the bonus, one-half of the 
gross bonus is ordered to be paid to defendant. 
5 
9. No permanent alimony is awarded, but plaintiff is 
ordered to pay to defendant temporary alimony in the amount of 
$500 per month for a period of one-year commencing with the month 
of March, 1986, with each installment due and payable on the 1st 
day of the month. 
Because of plaintiff's current financial 
circumstances, however, defendant is ordered to engage in no 
action to reduce these installments to judgment or enforce 
payment thereof through execution until April 1, 1987, in order 
to allow plaintiff an opportunity to receive his income bonus for 
the 1986 income year* Each installment of alimony shall bear 
interest from the date when due until paid at the rate of 10% per 
annum, and if by April 1, 1987 any installments have not been 
paid, then defendant shall be entitled to reduce any unpaid 
installments to judgment and enforce collection through 
execution, 
10. Defendant is awarded a judgment for the use and 
benefit of her attorney in the amount of $5,000 plus costs 
including all appraisal costs incurred by defendant in this 
proceeding in the amount of $670. This obligation for attorney's 
fees and costs shall be due and payable by April 1, 1987 and 
shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per annum until paid. 
6 
11. Each of the parties is ordered to execute any 
documents necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce when it is entered. 
\ day of O U. [ DATED this 
ATTEST 
-y- 1986. 






I hereby certify that on the day of 
1986, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce to: 
David S. Dolowitz 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Attorney for Defendant. 
7 
EXHIBIT "E" 
A t t o r n e y f o r . P l a i n t i f f t^QndWuu!^ 
142 E a s t 200 S o u t h 
G u a r d i a n P l a z a S u i t e 3 1 1 / r i l t U l W t t l K f t ^ t f f 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 / rI'•* i.tfi rMtiv 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 2 - 3 0 2 0 : w / 
IN THE THRID JUDICIAL DISTRICT COIART IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
\ y. .. LY Usfy ;' y 
STATE OF UTAH' ~ ' ' "'*'1 ' ' " ' " f.*u 
\ 
GARY W. JENSE, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
SARA A. JENSE, 
D e f e n d a n t ( s ) 
J U D G M E N T 
C i v i l N o . D 8 5 - 7 0 2 
J u d g e : D a n i e l s 
-ooOoo- H ^ - ^ ^ . ^ 
^ 
Hearing was set in the above entitled court and came on 
for hearing on the 14th day of January , 19*36, before the 
Honorable Judge Daniels. Plaintiff being represented by its 
Attorney, David S. Dolowitz, and Defendant(s) f^lft being 
represented her attorney B. L. Dart; the Court having heard the 
arguments from present parties, being fully advised in the 
premises, now therefore: _ * * 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that MUJULI 1 f-g is granted Judgment 
against RaCuuJai'iNp( a) for the principal sum of Forty Three 
Thousand Three Hundred and Fourteen Dollars and Forty-Six Cents. 
($43,314.46.), all court costs to and from the date of 
Judgement, interest at the rate of 12% and after accuring costs, 
attorney's fees. 
J 
BY THE COURT: y^Q ^ c ' l i ' ^ f f EXHIBIT E 
^kuajj^4 






page two of two 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the above foregoing Judgment as follows: David S. Dolowitz at: 




& R | 5 II os AM'87 ITEMIZATION OF JUDGMENT 
! 7,7 sW0ti±ici_sa^4 1. JUDGMENT in the amount of $2' 
paragraph seven (7) of Defendant's Decree of Divorce affopg with 
interest in the amount of $3,607.59 (12% from February 24, 1986 
to date.) 
2. ALIMONY in the amount of $5,549.80 as awarded in 
paragraph nine (9) of Defendant's Decree of Divorce. See below: 
12 months alimony @ $500.00 = $6,000.00 
Payments received -500.00 
Interest @10% 49.80 
$5,549.80 
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES in the amount of $5,000.00 as awarded in 
paragraph ten (10) of Defendant's Decree of Divorce and interest 
at the rate of 10% per annum until paid. Interest in the amount 
of $737.10 has accrued to date. Court costs in the amount of $670.00. 
THEREFORE JUDGMENT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. $31,357.56 
2. 5,549.80 
3 . 5>7 3 7 . 1 0 and Costs $670.00 
$ 4 3 , 3 1 4 . 4 6 
EXHIBIT "F" 
1 and the time in research, so I think an hour of it could 
2 be attributed to being new counsel in the case. The balance 
3 would have been incurred whether I was old or new counsel. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think in light of 
5 the testimony presented, I am going to grant the stay of 
5 execution for four months only. And I am also going to 
7 award attorneys fees to the defendant as partial payment 
8 for her attorneys fees in the amount of $600. 
9 In the meantime, the plaintiff will be directed 
not to sell or encumber any of his real property or personal 
property without — obviously he is trying to sell the house. 
I am not saying he can't do that. I am saying that he 















of either the real or personal property. 
If he hasn't got the home sold and is in a 
position to pay the judgment in four months, then I am 
18 going to be very disinclined to grant another stay, 
MR. DOLOWITZ: I would like to indicate to 
the Court I would like to pursue the question of the silver 
and bring that back before you and request a $10,000 credit 
for her taking the silver. 
THE COURT: I think you are certainly entitled 
to bring that before the Court. 





DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE £• LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
fuep w.ctFw* erritt 
ULUAKt 6CUHTT.UTAU 
Jw2«i 4i?PH*87 
Dir:* t u C R * 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
GARY W. JENSE 
vs. 




Civil No. D85-702 
Judge Scott Daniels 
* * * * * * * * 
This court, on the 9th day of July, 1986, entered a 
Decree of Divorce ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant 
certain sums of money. Execution on those sums was thereafter 
stayed until April 1, 1987. On April 1, 1987, a Judgment in the 
sum of $43,314.46 was entered in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff to effectuate all of the ordered payments. 
The defendant, after the entry of the Decree of Divorce, went to 
the safety-deposit box of the parties and removed from that, 
silver which the plaintiff has valued at $10,000.00. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff moves this court to require the 
defendant to enter a satisfaction of judgment for $10,000.00 of 
EXHIB X 0 o «/. 
the $43,314.46 owed to her on the basis that all of the 
furniture, fixtures, furnishings and appliances, except those 
specifically enumerated in the Decree were awarded to the 
plaintiff and that included the silver which has been taken by 
the defendant from the plaintiff. The plaintiff is willing to 
allow her to retain the silver, but wishes to require her to 
enter the Partial Satisfaction of Judgment requested herein based 
on her taking possession of that property. 
DATED this jj£ day of ., 1987. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to the 
following on this 2. */-"day of V/-^^--~--^? 1987: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
428 South 5th East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 




DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 




SARA A. JENSE, ) Civil No. D85-702 
) Judge Scott Daniels 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
GARY W. JENSE being duly sworn deposes and states: 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. A Decree of Divorce was granted to the parties 
by the above-entitled court on July 9, 1986. 
3. During the marriage there was a safety deposit 
box at Deseret Bank of Pleasant Grove containing several serving 
pieces and place settings of Grand Baroque silver which had been 
purchased by the parties during the marriage or given to the 
plaintiff and defendant as gifts. 
EXHIBIT H 
«LW IN.CURK'S OFFtCt 
SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH 
ton u)B!:!^ff\nM. tj)rc*n 
DLpL-Jr C L E R K 
4. This silver had been used by the family for 
special dinners and other occasions. 
5. Because of the value of this silver, the safety 
deposit box was obtained and the silver was kept in it for 
approximately three years. 
6. The silver removed by the Defendant from the 
safety deposit box is valued at approximately $10,000.00. Since 
the defendant was in charge of transferring the silver from the 
home to the safety deposit box, Plaintiff is unable to determine 
the exact pieces in the safety deposit box. Please see copy of 
First Interstate Bank Financial Statement attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A", prepared by Defendant stating the value of the 
silver. 
7. On April 1, 1987 a judgment was entered against 
me in the sum of $43,314.46, as a result of the ordered payments 
from the Decree of Divorce. 
8. I am willing to allow the defendant to keep the 
contents of the safety deposit box, but would require from the 
defendant a partial satisfaction of judgment in the amount of 
$10,000.00. 





Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
V1'- fU ., 1987. 
^
c
 J day oi 






: :\.MltX.-l;L i.ij^L 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT to 
7X 
the following on this 9 ^ —- day of ., 1987: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
428 South 5th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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Mow Long tmp*oyed~" 
MontnJy S«Ury 
EXHIBIT "I" 
(g) Not applicable, 
14. Describe all bank or other institution in which 
your name did not apear but in which you deposited money within 




15. Have there been bank or other institution accounts 
in which your name does not appear, but from which you withdrew 
money in the last two years? 
ANSWER: 
£57 NO, 
16. If the answer to the preceding Interrogatory is in 
the affirmative, please state with respect to each account: 
ANSWER: 
(lo) Is not applicable^J2> 
17. Identify and describe any^afety deposit boxes, 
vaults, safes or other places of deposit or safekeepT&^-in which 
you have deposited any item of value during the last five years 
and for each such deposit, state the following: 
a. The name and address of the institution or 
entity where the deposit is located; 
b. The identification or account number; 
EXHIBIT I 
c. The name and address of each person 
authorized to enter the deposit; 
d. Whether the deposit is still open, and, 
e. State with specificity each item located 
within the deposit and its present value. 
ANSWER: 
(17) (a) Deseret Bank, Pleasant Grove, Utah, 84062. 
(b) Unknown. 
(c) Sara A. Jense, and Lana Jense Bowles, 10 South 
3rd East, Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062. 
(d) Yes. 
(e) There are no items in the box and plaintiff 
has the keys. 
18. Identify any and all real property which you own 
or owned an interest at any time durinig your present marxiage, 
stating for each parcel of property; 
a. The street address and legal description; 
b. The size; 
c. A description of each building, structure or 
other improvement presently on the property; 
d. The method of acquisition of title; 
e. The date of acquisition; 
f. The name and address of the seller or person 
from whom title was acquired; 
10 
EXHIBIT "J" 
Attachment No. 2 
9200 North 4650 West, Utah County, All in Plaintiff's possession 
I. Entry Hall 
1. Antique wooden rocking horse 
2. Antique church pew - gift to defendant from friend 
3. Large wall hanging school clock 
4. Large antique copper frying pan circa 1585 - gift to 
defendant from parents 
5. Various framed watercolors, prints, accessories 
6. Silver-plated silver bell collection "The Twelve Days 
of Christmas" 
II. Living Room 
1. Large corner cupboard - Christmas gift to defendant 
from plaintiff 
2. Red velvet couch 
3. Two end tables 
4. Two lamps 
5. Lighted curio cabinet - Christmas gift to defendant 
from plaintiff 
6. Pair of large wooden candlesticks 
7. French provincial arm chair - gift to defendant from 
parents 
8. Nantucket rocking chair - gift to defendant from father 
9. Round skirted table 
10. Piano - gift to plaintiff from mother 
11. Two piece stereo set - one piece gift to plaintiff 
from mother 
12. Large "flax" antique spinning wheel - Christmas gift 
from defendant to plaintiff 
13. Antique framed sampler - gift to defendant from 
Freda Brey 
14. Pair of glass Venetian figurines 
15. Four antique glass shoes 
16. Four Lladro figurinies - gifts to defendant for 
Mother's Day, anniversaries, etc. 
17. Various Royal Doulton figurines - gifts to defendant 
for various occassions 
18. Collection of bells - limited editions, silver and china 
19. Collection of "Coalport Cottages" - gifts to defendant 
for various occassions 
20. Numerous pictures, accessories, antique artifacts, etc. 
21. Collection of Hummel figurines - gifts to defendant 
from mother, children, friends 
EXHIBIT J 
* 1 - 1 • t -. < 1 
Refracting taole ancl benches 
T
 arge china cupboard - Christmas gill Lo defendant 
f ~om plaintiff 
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Collection of pewter plates - Christmas gift from 
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DAVID . DC LOw \. i^b^ 
of and t 
PARSONS, BLli,_ v. ».- • 
Attorneys for Plamtif: 
185 South S t ar * Street - u11c , 
P.O. Box 118 in: 
Salt Lake Citv, Uta: 4/- 0898 




IN THE Th -:;. .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT "F ~A.LT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE r i , t !"! ,;AL; 
G A R Y W . J E N S E 
v s . 
, A R A ,'"', I! I 'M1 III 
D e: 1 iJ 1 * v 
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EXHIBIT K 
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DATED tv-.fr > j day of ^<^^di^=^ 
^. 
DAVID S. D0L0W1TZ " T 
MAILING CERTIFICATl 
f i - "Staqe 
V ^ 7 i -
v.. u . g M. ire t e r s o n 
L 1 T T L E F I E L D & PETERSON 
4 z 8 S o u t i ' K a s t 
HA Ti Q H O 
- 3 -
EXHIBIT "L" 
DAVID S . DOLOWITZ ( 0 8 9 9 ) 
of and f o r 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
A t t o r n e y s fo r P l a i n t i f f 
185 Sou th S t a t e S t r e e t , S u i t e 700 
P .O. Box 11898 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84147-0898 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 532-1234 
F,UC IN CORK'S OFFICE 
SALTUXE "-JKTX.U.Ah 
AUG 3 3 m PH '81 
DLTJ:^ CLEM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
GARY W. JENSE 
vs. 




Civil No. D85-702 
Judge Scott Daniels 
* * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
GARY W. JENSE being duly sworn deposes and states: 
1. I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. A Decree of Divorce was granted to the parties 
by the above-entitled court on July 9, 1986. 
3. Pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of the Decree of 
Divorce, plaintiff was awarded the home of the parties at 9200 
North 4650 West, Pleasant Grove, Utah. 
4. Plaintiff has had the home for sale for 
approximately six (6) months but due to the depressed real estate 
EXHIBIT L 
market in Utah County, the house has not sold and plaintiff has 
been told by several real estate agents that the net amount 
plaintiff will receive from the sale of the home will be 
approximately $119,0 00,00. 
5. Plaintiff since the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce has serviced the significant debt on the property as well 
as marital debts during the pendency of the divorce to the 
present time as set out in detail in Exhibit A attached hereto. 
6. Due to plaintiff's employer merging with Zions 
Mortgage Company, plaintiff's employment was terminated as of 
July 17, 1987. 
7. Plaintiff received $2400.00 on July 17, 1987 and 
$3700.00 on July 30, 1987 as severance pay. There is presently a 
dispute over an additional $1,000.00 owed to plaintiff. Please 
see documentation attached to support severance pay received. 
8. Plaintiff is in need of severance pay received 
to service debts and pay living expenses as outlined in paragraph 
5 above and Exhibit B attached hereto. If the debts outlined in 
paragraph 5 above are not serviced, both plaintiff and defendant 
will be liable. 
9. Plaintiff has been employed by American Equity 
for 15 years and received bonuses ranging from $10,000 to 
$72,000. There was no bonus paid for 1986. 
-2-
u*. { DATED this ^ day of August, 1987. 
GARY Wy JENSE// 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this y,^^^ day of 
July, 1987. 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
<e~i- PI 
JOTARY PUBJ#C £/ , <? NO ^_. „ 
Residing at: ^*J J fi /''/' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT to 
-~~ day of August, 1987: 
Craig M. Peterson 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
428 South 5th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 




JENSE V. JENSE 
MARITAL DEBTS SERVICED BY PLAINTIFF 
(INCLUDED IN EXHIBIT B) 
Monthly Payment 
9200 West $1,748.57 
4650 West 
Repayment on 742.00 
daughter's school 
loan 
Pleasant Grove 229.00 
Rental Property -
Receives $275 
toward payment of $504. 
$2,719.57 — Monthly Debt 
Obligation 
Since July, 1986, Plaintiff has paid — $32,634.84 
(primarily interest — little principal reduction) 
FT070787D 
"EXHIBIT B" 
GARY W. JENSE V. SARA A. JENSE 
^ - , • k * • • 
PLAINTIFF'S MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Husband 
Mortgage payments $*1,748.57 
Real property insurance ** 
Maintenance ** 
Food and household supplies 200.00 
Utilities 250.00 
Telephone 40.00 
Laundry and cleaning 50.00 
Clothing 50.00 
***Medical and dental 200.00 
Entertainment 10 0.00 
Incidentals 25.00 
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance) 300.00 
Installment payment(s) 1,121.00 
TOTAL EXPENSES $4,0 84.57 
*Includes first and second mortgage 
**Included in mortgage payments 
***Because of unemployment, plaintiff is responsible for 
payment 
**** $ 150.00 Credit Cards 
742.00 Repayment daughter's school loan (Holly) 
229.00 Rental property, Pleasant Grove - (Net) 
FT070787D 
ZIONS BANCORPORATION 
1380 KENNEGOTT BUILDING 
SALT LAKE GITY, UTAH 8 4 1 3 3 
(801) 5 2 4 - 4 7 8 7 
H A R R I S H. S I M M O N S 
PRESIDENT 
July 28, 1987 
Mr. Gary Jense 
P. 0. Box 422 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
Dear Gary: 
As per our discussion the other day, I am enclosing a check representing 
additional severance pay for 304 hours of work. This brings the total, 
including the 160 hours paid two weeks ago, to 464 hours. This is 40 hours 
short of the amount you had requested. The shortfall represents 40 hours 
of sick leave pay. As a company, we have never paid unused sick leave to 
any terminated employees under any circumstances. Inasmuch as this liability 
had not been accrued by American Equity, and inasmuch as this is not a benefit 
which we would provide for any of our own terminated employees, we cannot 
justify a payment for those hours. 
I want to wish you well in all of your endeavors. Though the circumstances 
under which we found ourselves working together were somewhat difficult, we 
appreciate the help you rendered in the aftermath of the purchase of the 
Foothill Financial assets. Best wishes. 
Sincerely, 




1380 KENNECOTT BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84133 
} A T E 
>AY 
J u l y 29 , 19&7ZiOtfS*. M&lffi™ 3 7 5 9 rfni's € 8 ct 
Z I O N S 
F I R S T N A T I O N A L B A N K 
ONE S O U T H M A I N STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 
$ 3 , 759.68 
3 1 - 5 
1 2 4 0 
;DEH r GARY JENSE ~l Z I O N S B A N C D R P D R A T I D N 
L J 
N FULL PAYMENT OF SEVERANCE CLAIMS 
"'0 2 5S?3»' •: I 21,0000 SMI OE 1100 3 Rw 







^ 6 ~ 71 
PAYEE DETACH THIS STATEMENT BEFORE DEPOSITING CHECK. 
GARY JENSE N2 2587 
DESCRIPTION 304 HOURS GROSS 80A0.80 FICA 574.92 
2556.00 ST 1150.20 NET 3759.68 
DESCRIPTION TO BE KEY PUNCHED 
NET AMOUNT: 
3 , 7 5 9 . 6 8 
ZKNS P.ANC0RF0RATI0N 











TOTAL EARNINGS 4 4 4 2 * ^ 1 




































































GARY K JFNSE 415 755 000005 26 4096 40 
FOR PERIOD ENDING Ql~30 ~B1 
ZICKS EANCCFPORATION 
710NS PANCCFPORATION 







755JENSE, GARY K 
GARY W JENSE 
, f-y v /. n « 
EXHIBIT "M" 
CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
Attorney for Defendant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
GARY W. JENSE, ) 
) VERIFIED REPLY TO 
Plaintiff, ) PLAINTIFFfS MOTION 
v. ) 
SARA A. JENSE, ) 
) Civil No. D85-702 
Defendant. ) (Judge Scott Daniels) 
ooOoo 
The Plaintiff above named filed a Motion with this Court 
dated June 24, 1987, seeking relief in the form of a reduction of 
the Judgment heretofore entered in this matter in the amount of 
$43,314.46 by $10,000.00 for personal property in the form of 
silverware. The Defendant replies to said Motion as follows: 
1. The Decree of Divorce entered in this matter 
provides at paragraph 4b that the Defendant is awarded all fur-
niture and furnishings located in the condominium at 29 South 
State, #718, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
July 9, 1986, the silverware was located in the condominium. The 
silverware was removed from the safety deposit box in March, 
1985, and taken at that time to Defendant's condominium. 
EXHIBIT M 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is the Affidavit of Kay L. Jacobs, 
the keeper of records for the bank where the safety deposit box 
is located showing that the last time anyone had access to the 
safety deposit was Marchf 1985. 
3. The silverware had been stored in a safety deposit 
box for only a short time because there had been a series of 
thefts in the neighborhood where the parties resided at the time 
of their separation. Each of the parties knew and understood 
that the silverware was the property of the Defendant having been 
acquired by her prior to the marriage of the parties and each 
understood that she had possession of it and would retain its 
ownership. 
4. In any event, the value of the silverware is not 
$10,000.00 as stated by the Plaintiff and supported by a 
Financial Declaration which he prepared and signed. The actual 
value of the silverware is $4,417.50. See Exhibit "B", Statement 
of Suggested Retail Value. 
5. It has been necessary for the Defendant to acquire 
the services of an attorney to represent her in defending against 
the Motion of the Plaintiff which has been unreasonably brought 
before this Court and it is reasonable that she be awarded such 
attorney's fees and costs as she may incur in the defense of this 
Motion. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that Plaintiff's Motion be 
dismissed, that he take nothing thereby and that Defendant be 
-2-
awarded her attorney's fees and costs which she may have incurred 
in these proceedings. 
DATED this day of August, 1987. 
CRAIG M. PETERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
\>l/L-i* A . M V^Vw-A 
SARA A. JENSE/ / 
Defendant \ 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SARA A. JENSEf being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says that she has read the above and foregoing Verified Reply 
to Plaintiff's Motion and knows and understands the contents 
thereof and the same is true as to her own knowledge except to 
those matters herein stated upon information and belief and as 
to those matters, she believes the same to be true. 
VA:.? A- K)l i-.J^K 
SARA A. JENSE' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Zj day of 
August, 1987. ' , ' . , , , . 
• • [ • ' A u f? '('A. • .-•;• ' : • 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: C-t'- •-! 
My Commission Expires: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Verified Reply to Plaintiff's 
Motion to David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Plaintiff, 185 South 
State Street, Suite 700, Post Office Box 11898, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84147-0898, this '/•& day of August, 1987. 
21753 
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CRAIG M. PETERSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
426 South Fifth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-30435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
—ooOoo— 
A F F I D A V I T 
of 
Kay L. Jacobs 
Civil No. D85-702 
GARY W. JENSE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SARA A. JENSE, 
Defendants, * 
—ooOoo— 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW Kay L. Jacobs being first duly sworn, 
deposes, and states as follows: 
1. That he is the President of Deseret Bank. 
2. That in the normal course of business he 
supervises, among other things, the safety deposit boxes and the 
books and records thereof. 
3. That he is personally familiar with the records 
regarding box #370.<^«<r/ ^ c r ^ ^  "2i£.4/ 
&S i*fe 
4. That on April 16, 1982 box #370^was assigned to and 
access was granted as follows: Sara Jense, Gary Jense, and Lana 
Bowles. 
5. That the last recorded visit, made to box #370,^  was ^ | 
on March 22, 1985, at the hour of 10:45 a.m. 
EXHIBIT A 
-page two of two- j 
6. That the last rental payment, on box #370,/ was I 
reoruary ±o, I^OD req 
I70^ be closed. *'y 
received February 6, 1985. Said payment secured box to December 
31, 1985. 
7. That on February 18, 1986 request was received, by 
the bank, that box #3' 
8. That statements made and facts contained herein are 
based upon personal knowledge and substantiated by bank records. 
DATED this / ^ ^ day of August, 1987. 
Kay L. J a c o b s / 
P re s iden t of Desere t Bank 
66 South Main 
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this '^J&e!y of 
August, 1987. 
Notary Pul^l ic . / ! . ~7 I / 
Residing i n : Z^f/r^JY</ff O^k/-/^ 
My Commission E x p i r e s : J /fa W///V£ '->'d- /*/?{? 
t 
CURRENT VALUE - SUGGESTED RETAIL FROM MANUFACTURER 
SILVER - GRAND BAROQUE PATTERN 
WALLACE SILVERSMITHS 
, 4 piece place settings @ $320.00 = 
*4 piece place setting consists of 
teaspoon, place knife, place fork 
and salad fork. 
cream soup spoons © $90.00 = 
ice cream spoons i $95.00 = 
butter spreaders © $80.00 = 














July 1986 price was $169.00, 4 piece place setting. 
August 1987 mail order price from The Yankee Merchant Group, 
$133.50 for 4 piece place setting. 
August 1987 mail order price from James Kaplan Jewelers, 
$136.95 for 4 piece setting. 
EXHIBIT R 
EXHIBIT "N" 
CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
Attorney for Defendant 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
GARY W. JENSE, ) 
) ANSWER TO MOTION TO AMEND 
Plaintiff, ) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v. ) 
SARA A. JENSE, ) 
) Civil No. D85-702 
Defendant. ) (Judge Scott Daniels) 
ooOoo 
The Defendant above named, by and through counsel, 
Craig M. Peterson, answers Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Decree of 
Divorce dated August 3, 1987, as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's fails to state a cause of action upon which 
relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. Defendant admits paragraph 2 of Plaintiff's Motion 
insofar as it alleges that he received bonuses. However, 
Defendant is without sufficient information to admit or deny that 
the Plaintiff did not receive a bonus in 1986 and, therefore, 
denies the same. 
2. Defendant denies paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of 
Plaintiff's Motion. 
EXHIBIT N 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
All of the issues raised by Plaintiff's Motion are res 
judicata, being issues relating to the division of the marital 
estate of the parties at the time of trial and the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce in this matter. All such issues were litigated 
and an Order entered making a division of the estate at that time 
based upon circumstances and facts which then existed. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Motion is brought only for the purpose of 
further avoiding collection in this matter and is not brought in 
good faith, believing in the merits of his action. It is reason-
able that the Defendant should be awarded such attorney's fees 
and costs as she may incur in her defense of these proceedings. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant having fully replied to Motion of 
the Plaintiff, prays that the same be dismissed, that he take 
nothing thereby and that Defendant be awarded such attorney's 
fees and costs as she may have incurred in her defense of these 
proceedings. 
DATED this f~/ day of AuqjuKTE} 1987 
IG W. PETERS 
rney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer to Motion to Amend 
Decree of Divorce to David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
-2-
185 South State Street, Suite 700, Post Office Box 11898, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84147-0898, this 2 clay of August, 1987. 
21754 
EXHIBIT "0" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 



























GARY W. JENSE, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
— v s — D R5 702 
PLAINTIFFS ' 
MOTION TO AMEND 
SARA A . J E N S E , 
D e f e n d a n t , 
BE IT REMEMBERED, t h a t on A u g u s t 2 4 , 1 9 8 7 , a t t h e h o u r 
o f 8 : 3 0 a . m . , t h e a b o v e - c a p t i o n e d c a u s q o f a c t i o n came on 
r e g u l a r l y f o r h e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e HON. SCOTT DANIELS, one o f 
t h e J u d g e s o f t h e a b o v e - n a m e d C o u r t . 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
F o r t h e P l a i n t i f f ; 
F o r t h e D e f e n d a n t : 
MR. DAVID S . DOLCWriZ 
A t t o r n e y A t Law 
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t . 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Uta l i 
MR. CRAIG M. PETERSEN 
A t t o r n e y At* Law 
426 S o u t h 5 t h E a s t 
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 
EXHIBIT 0 
WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had: 
THE COURT: Gary W. Jense versus Sara A. Jense. 
Motion to Amend the Decree of Divorce. This your motion, Mr. 
Dolowitz, you may proceed. 
MR. DOLOWITZ: Court want to hear testimony? It 
would be precisely as set forth in the affidavit. Two 
affidavits and two motions before the Courtrand if you want, 
I can have that testimony «and run through it on the basis tha^: 
it's already before you. 
THE COURT: I see no problem in just proceeding 
on the basis of the affidavit unless you have a problem with 
that. 
MR. PETERSON: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You can proceed. 
MR. DOLOWITZ: Your Honor, on the evidence that 
we would put forward, we ask for amendment in two areas. 
First is,VB would seek to be credited with ten-thousand 
dollars for the silver that was taken from the safe-deposit 
box;that the silver was in the safe-deposit box at the time 
we came before you for trial. While we were negotiating the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Decree, it was 
removed and taken by Mrs. Jense. At the time we were before 
you, it was in the possession of Mr. Jens§.. Your ruling 
would have left it with him. She removed it. We are willing 
to give it to her, but we want credit on the judgment. The 
second item, Your Honor, involves request that the judgment 
2 
the matters that have been reduced to judgment, 
$43,314.46 as of April 1st, 1987, be either reduced or deal-
ing from our view, totally terminated based on a change of 
circumstances;that is, my client has lost his job. 
Now, as you recall, the system wherein he was working 
for, ultimately, Foothill Thrift, based oh his earnings from 
the year before, he would-be paid a bonus. Based on his '84 
earnings, there was a substantial bonus in '85. Based on hi«£ 
'85 earnings there was a bonus in '86. That •86 bonus was 
divided. You had him pay half to Mrs. Jense and he kept hal| 
You also entered, as part of your judgment, that there 
are $27,000 some odd dollar judgment, alimony and attorney 
fees;but after my client had paid off the taxes that v/ere du^, 
there simply wasn't enough cash, so you stayed execution on 
the judgment until 1987, when the '86 bonus would come in. 
There was no '86 bonus. What happened in 1986, Foothill did 
not produce enough, so that there could be a bonus rand v/hen 
we were before you last, Foothill was facing receivership. 
But now, at this point, Foothill has been taken over by 
Zion's Bank. And my client has been released. Not only doe^ 
he not have a bonus for .'86, that will be paid in '87, he 
doesn't even have a job. The last money that he received 
from his employment, as we set out in the affidavit, is 
approximately $7000, is what he has received. That was the 




















in Utah County, at least he has an offer on it. 
At the time we were before you, it was .$50,000. The sale 
price is going to produce around #19,000. We will get sorae-
-where between nineteen and twenty-thous and dollars in cash 
when that sale completes. Ke has, on the other side, servicejl 
the debt that kept the properties together,and while those 
assets were awarded to him, if he doesn't service those debtsL 
Mrs. Jense is also a co-signer on those debts. And we have 
detailed those debts in the affidavit;and she will be equally 
liable with them. 
His living expenses continue, consequently, we think, 
under the criteria that has been set out by the Utah Supreme 
[Court, we meet the test for a substantial change in circum-
stances that is required to modify the property provision s ofj 
the Decree in this case, to give her the silver and something 
to eliminate the rest of:the judgment on the change. My clienjt 
simply can't pay it;and based on the circumstances, that he 
18 kould have these ongoing bonuses to be able to pay this judge-] 
-ment that you made on the marital estate, it is not what you 






ray client to Mrs. Jense; and has been switched by the hous e 
being over $30,000 less than the Court determined that it was. 
[Yet it based the judgment on a $27,000 to equalize the maritalj 
estate. Now, that wouldn't equalize it. In fact, it would 
make it even more unequal thah it already is. 
4 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, We filed an Answer to 
Amended Decree of Divorce. Under the terms of the decree of 
divorce,the Court directed that Mrs. Jense would receive the 
property, which was located in her condominium;that Mr. Jense! 
would receive property which he had, and some specific divis-j 
-ions, which the Court ordered on personal property awarded 
to Mrs. Jense. Those divisions, though they were ordered by 
the Court, have not yet been made. That is, Mr. Jense has 
not made the transfer, but the silver which is at issue, deal 
-rly was not in the possession of Mr. Jense at the time of th| 
hearing on this matter in 1986;and he knew that it was never 
in his possession. Knew that it belonged to Mrs. Jense. 
The silver was located, at the time of the divorce, 
in the condominium, where Mrs. Jense resided here in Salt 
Lake City;and that's clear from the affidavit attached to the 
Reply, which is the affidavit. A Pleasant Grove bank shows 
the last time these parties had two safe-deposit boxes—by th| 
way, the last time either of those boxes were entered into byj 
anyone was in March of 1985, when the daughter of the parties 
went to the safe-deposit box and removed the silverware,by th| 
way, silverware, which Mr. Jense knows was accumulated by 
Mrs. Jense from the time she was a small child up to the 
date of the marriage;and no addition made to that silverware. 
But the Court ordered that would be hers, fully one 
year before this matter was heard by the Court. 
5 
That was taken from the safe-deposit box and was in 
her possession. Mr. Jense "knows that. I think the represent-
ations in the affidavits here before the Cou: t today are 
clearly not honest. Those items were removed and were in heir 
possession at the time of the decree as Mr. Jense knows. In| 
addition, the only reason that they were even in the safe-
-deposit box was because there had been a series of thefts 
in the Alpine neighborhood where they lived. And they had 
removed them and put them in the safe-d§posit box for a shor-f: 
period of time for safekeeping. Never anticipated by Mr. 
Jense they would be his. They were not in his possession at] 
•the time of the decree of divorce. 
The divorce is accurate. It's a misrepresentation to| 
state to this Court-at the time they came before the Court, 
I wasn't counsel at the time. Out it's a clear misrepresent] 
-ation to state now before the Court, especially based upon 
the affidavits that they received and acknowledged,that he 
has, that this was in his possession at the time. It was 
not. The evidence is clear and I have the records here, 
though I didn't submit them to the Court—I have the records] 
of entrance into the safe-desposit box, which will clearly 
show, if the Court wants to review them;the last time anyone! 
entered into either one of these safe-deposit boxes was fully 
one year before this matter was tried by the Court. I thinki 
the motion- is not well-founded. I think it is specious and 
6 
I think that us being here today to defend against that 
should entitle us to attorney fees and ask for that relief 
in response to his motion. Without question that's the case 
In addition,as an aside, you'll notice from Mr. Jense's affi4 
-davit, that he bases the value of that silver on a financial 
declaration that he himself prepared and signed. Has no 
signature of Sara Jense. lie set that value at ten-thousand 
dollars on that old 1984 loan application, because he was 
seeking a loan. But you'll notice also from our Answer,that 
the maximum value, based on full retail suggested manufactu-
rer's price, is $4,400 for the settings that they had. So, 
first and most important under the terms of the Order, as it 
was entered, that property was .in her possession at the time 
this matter came before the Court and had been in her possesfj 
-ion for at least a year--March of this ^wasn't heard unti.} 
April of '86. So, from Jtfarch '85 until April of '86, that 
property was in her possession. The Court ordered she would 
have that property, which was in her possession. Clearly a 
misrepresentation on that. part. Second page, the value of it} 
is nowhere near what Mr. Jense says. Simply trying to gain 
an advantage by making these misrepresentations to the Court 
here today. 
Dotiiof those positions clearly indicated it is not 
necessary to be hex3 today on that particular issue. We 
shouldn't be here today;as a result, we are entitled to 
7 
attorney's fees and should be awarded we believe in this 
particular hearing. 
The second matter is more disconcerting to me. Thai} 
is, Mr. Jense is now before the Court and'represents to the 
Court, that because his job status has changed, that the 
Court should come in and modify an award of property, which 
the Court made over a year and a half ago, based upon the 
circumstances as they existed then. That is, the properties 
as they existed then. 
Mr. Jense had the advantage at that time of receiv-
ing the home, which he wanted to receive and placing it for 
sale and getting the equity out of it;b\it as the Court will 
recall from her testimony, Mr. Jense simply left that home 
Didn't actively market it. It was his testimony at the 
previous hearing in %>ril of this year, when we were trying 
to execute on this judgment that he had, that it wasn't 
formally listed. But he had a friend, who had been trying tcj> 
market it to some degree in the Utah County area. 
Now, I'll advise the Court, that it finally has sol<jl 
and Mr. Jense is suffering the same thing that everyone else 
has suffered, who has received parcels of real property. 
That there is some decline in the market place. The property 
at that time was listed at approximately $145 to $150,000, 
that is, at the time of the divorce* 
I'll advise the Court that Mr. Jense now represents 
8 
1 to the Court that he has an offer on that at $119,000 \ 
2 That's not honest either. He has an earnest money contract 
3 at $124,500. He has misrepresented the offering price here 
4 today by over $5000 and he knows that. I am curious as to 
5 why he would make that representation. He is down by approx-f 
6 -imately 15 % on the value the Court determined based upon 
7 his representations at that time. I think he is bound by hid 
8 representation to the Court too, by the fact that he wanted 
9 to receive that properly. He was willing to assume the risk 
I0 if he could get the property at that time, and assumed the 
jI risk. 
12 It's error at this point to come in and make a 
13 modification of a property distribution based upon e change 
14 I of circumstances that has occurred only in the last six 
15 months, vhen clearly I think it is res judicata completely on 
16 that particular issue. The Court has determined in Folger 
17 versus Folger, that has not JVE t to be a change of circumstaA-
18 -ces,hut an extraordinary change of circumstances something 
19 akin to misrepresentation at the time of the hearing for a 
20 change of property distribution. That's not the case here. 
21 If the Court is genuinely interested and believes thai}: 
22 there is a basis for consideration of modification of a 
23 property distribution, then I think we have a right to a 
24 complete trial and open that issue, rather than this very 
25 short hearing and these proffers of counsel, which is coming 
before the Court today;but I think there is not suffij-
-cient showing and there is not sufficient reason to come in 
and set aside a property distribution which the Court ordered 
at that time;and that's what the Court did. 
Mrs. Jense didn't get alimony. She was employed and 
the Court made property distributions and gave her this larg4 
sum judgment based upon the property distribution and property 
values as represented to the Court at the time of the trial. 
The Court accepted the property values which existed then. 
The change between then and now is not sufficient reason to 
simply come in and amend a decree of divorce. 
As I am saying, one, we don't think there is sufficient 
cause for even a consideration of change of the property;but 
if there is, then we believe we're entitled to a complete 
trial on that issue in order to determine, in fact, whether 
there was or was not some sort of misrepresentation at the 
time of the hearing on the trial. 
And again, I think we are here unneccessarily to defeijid 
-ing this issue and again, I think we're entitled to our fees 
and costs as we have incurred them in this proceeding, Your 
Honor, and based on that, we'll submit it. 
THE COURT: How much is the judgment that's owed?| 
MR. DOLOWITZ: $43,314.46 as of April 1st. 
MR. PETERSON: Plus interest. In addition, a six] 
hundred dollars award of attorney's fees for our appearance 
1 
before the Court last time, in reality, round figures is) 
forty-four thousand dollars. 
THE COURT: And you're asking that that be forgivejn? 
MR. DOLOWITZ: That's correct. 
THE COURT: And what would happen to the $20,000 
of equity that he is going to get on the American Fork home?! 
MR. DOLOWITZ: In the situation that he is involvejd 
in, that he is in a cash negative situation each month and 
he has been using the bonuses each year to pay the debt;he 
has been paying a second mortgage on that home. He didn't 
get a bonus for '86. He still has on-going debts and those 
have to be paid off. 
THE COURT: So, he would get the $20,000 to pay 
off his debt and a negative cash-flow situation. If I give 
you everything you want. But he would get $44,000 judgment 
forgiven and that would be in return,she would be able to 
keep the silverware? 
MR. DOLOWITZ: That's correct. That would be, ifl 
you want to call it that, " our dea]". That's our request. 
There were a number of statements made about misrepresentatipr 
I don't think are true and were misrepresented to you. That]1 
an awful strong word for counsel to use;and I believe you 
ought to look at it. To start out with, he said no alimony.] 
She was awarded alimony for a year. We stayed execution on 
it. That's part of the judgment. Said there were misrepre-
sentations. I said he was going to net $119 on the house. 
1 
1 Pidn't say that it was 124. I gave the Court the 
2
 net figure rather than the gross figures, because I thought 
3 that was important. That's presented as though that is some 
4
 kind of misrepresentation to you. If there is any misrepres 
5 -entation it is this business with the silver. When Mr. 
6
 Dart and I tried this case before you on January 14, 1986# 
^ the silver was in my clients's possession in a safe-deposit 
8 box. She went to the safe-depositLbox after the trial;when 
' we presented our exhibits to you, we presented everything. 
'0 The silver was in his possession not in her condominium,yet 
'1 Mr. Peterson stands up before you and says we all knew it, 
12 but I didn't say we knew it. But at "the time the decree was 
'3 he says we knew it when we were before you in April of '87. 
14
 If you want to talk about misrepresentation, that is 
'5 the kind of misrepresentation I think the Court should look 
'
6
 at and examine with particularity. I would suggest that you 
17
 look over the trial exhibits and you'll see that the silver 
18
 was in my clients' possession when this matter was tried. 
19
 THE COURT: When was it tried? 
20
 MR. DOLOWITZ:' Tried in January of 1986. 
21
 THE COURT: V7ell, according to the affidavit, the 
22
 last recorded visit was in March of 1985. 
23
 MR. DOLOWITZ: The decree recites that we were 
24
 before you on the 14th of January 1986. My client said that 
" he had the silverware in his possession at that time;was in 
I his safe-deposit box as far as he knew;that M^s Jense got it. 
1 She got it sometime after Mr, Dart and I were before 
2 you for trial. Taken it out of the box at that time. He 
3 became aware of it sometime—some months after that. That 
4 he and I were talking and he became aware the silverware had| 
5 been moved, but at the time that we came in before you for 
6 trial, it was our belief that that silver was still in the 
7 safe-deposit box;and I think that is evidenced by an examin-
8 -ation of the Findings of Fact that are set out too. But yo^ i 
9 understand what our position is. All I am doing is to reply] 
10 to what I think was a misrepresentation. If you want a full 
H trial on the matter we're willing to do it. I don't think 
12 it's necessary;we've covered it, I think here. What you're) 
13 dealing with is a situation like Chandler versus Wei£. In 
14 that case the Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a 
15 decree that'.told the husband to make payments on the house 
16 mortgage until it was paid off. The wife remarried, sold thA 
17 house and then sued on the decree, saying you now have to pay 
18 me the money for the rest of the house, because I paid off 
19 the money. The trial judge, in that particular case held 
20 that the decree meant what it said. You've got to pay off 
21 that judgment. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, referring 
22 to Chandler versus Chandler and said, when you have signifi-
23 -cant change of circumstances, you have the power to amend 
24 the decree;you do not simply enforce it. And we're saying 
25 that type of change of circumstances occurred in this case. 
1 You entered a ruling that found that there should be 
2
 payments from my client to Mrs. Tosara and those were baseq 
3 on certain findings, including the value of the house and 
4
 the pattern of bonuses that my client received. It did not 
5 foresee him losing his job so there waid be no bonuses with 
6
 which to be able to pay the judgment that we're talking 
7
 about;and didn't figure opt the house would drop 20 or 30-
8
 thousand dollars, which is more than the ammount you ordere4 
9
 paid over in judgment to equal the marital estate. And we 
10 are now in a situation where Mrs, Jense is employed and Mr. 
" Jense is not. She's the one who is still in the solid 
12 financial position, not my client. 
13 THE COURT: Well, I think it's a tough'thing to 
14 know what to do, because it's true that the property settle-} 
15 -ment was based upon the presumption that he was going to 
'
6
 get a pretty big bonus, because he always had. And I didn^ 
'' think he would have got a bigger bonus than I anticipated. 
'
8
 On the other hand, I don't know that it would have changed 
19 the property settlement. I think, based upon the equities 
20
 of the case, I am going to rule as follows: I am going to-4 
21
 MR, PETERSON: Before you rule, I wuld like to ma)|e 
22
 one point. He did get one big bonus which was distributed. 
23
 THE COURT: That's right. It was distributed, 
24
 that's right. And as I recall the ruling,that one was goinqr 
2
* to be cut in half. That's what happened, but we anticipates. 
14 
that he would get a bonus in 1987 based upon 1986 
earnings. And just that there is not as much money as they 
thought there was going to be and I don't know what to do 
about what I am going to do is this ,though* I think thaj: 
the equity from the home should be to her. She should get 
that $19 or $20,000, whatever it is and the silver should go 
to her;and that's really ctll there is. And so, I think if 
that goes to her, the remainder of the judgment, the other 
$24,000 will be considered satisfied. Now, I don't suppose 
either of them are going to be too happy with that outcome. 
MR. PETERSON: One point you need to be aware of. 
That $24,000 satisfaction ruling, Your Honor, Mrs. Jense, 
were she called to testify, would testify, as you made that 
ruling, seven-thousand of that was furniture, which he kept 
and still has ,in part of the furniture distribution, if the 
Court is going to change the ruling in consideration of that 
then I guess, we need to reopen all of it, so that you make 
adequate furniture and personal property distributions as 
well. -
THE COURT: Where is that furniture, in the house?] 
MR. PETERSON: Still in the house. 
MR. DOL0WITZ: We have made repreated attempts to 
get her to come down and pick i£ up. None of them have come| 
to fruition. 


























t o him, not t h e f u r n i t u r e t h a t was awarded t o h e r . 
MR. DOLOWITZ: Thought you were t a l k i n g about 
t h i n g s t h a t a r e Tier 's s t i l l in t h e h o u s e . 
MR. PETERSON: We s t i l l want t h o s e . 
MR. DOLOWITZ: Been asking h e r t o come down and 
6 p i ck them up . 
MR. PETERSON: We have made the request. Simply 
haven't facilitated on the furniture that was awarded to her. 
Her point is very simply, they are in this judgments jyau gave! 
consideration of seven-thousand dollars in furniture that was 
awarded to him, when you made that'-judgment: So, as a result] 
what happened is, he is now receiving satisfaction of $24,000( 
while there was a seven-thousand dollars consideration in 
there that he is still retaining. 
THE COURT: Well, I see your point, but you know, 
the bottom line is, as it turned out, when all was said and 
done, she appears to me has ended up with considerably more 
than half of the marital estate, you know. Maybe that's the 
way it should be;but seems to me that the bottom line, you 
know, after everything happened, that we didn't foresee 
considering the drop in value of the property, considering noj 
bonus therei What was there really to divide up, she still 
ends up with mere than half of it and half was all she was 
entitled to. She's having to suffer some of the disadvantage^ 












C E R T I F I C A T E 
' j <30n't suppose I will either. The problem is, 
2
 there is not as much money as he thought there.would be. 
3 That will be the ruling. Under the circumstances, no 
4
 attorney's fees will be awarded for this particular hearing 
5 and I'll ask Mr. Dolowitz to prepare an Order and submit it] 
6
 to Mr. Peterson for approval as to form. 
7
 MR. DOLOWITZ: ,1 will. 
8




 | STATE OF UTAH ) 
12 I SALT LAKE COUNTY) 
'3 I, Hal M. Walton, do hereby certify that I am a 
*
4
 Certified Shorthand Reporter of the State of Utah;that on 
'5 j August 24th, 1987, I appeared before the above-named Court 
and reported in Stenograph the proceedings outlined in the 
preceeding 16 pages of hearing transcript and that the same 
is a true and correct transcriptioh of my shorthand notes 
as reported by me. 
Dated: September 23, 1987 
EXHIBIT " P " 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
GARY JENSE, 
VS. 
SARA A. JENSE, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AND 
PRIOR ORDERS OF THE COURT 
Civil No. D85-702 
Judge Scott Daniels 
* * * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court, the 
Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, on Monday, the 24th day of 
August, 1987. The plaintiff was present in person and repre-
sented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The defendant was present 
in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson. The 
court, after being advised by the parties that their testimony 
would be in accordance with the written pleadings and affidavits 
they had filed with the court, determined with the agreement of 
counsel for each of the parties, to accept that as being the tes-
timony and then heard and considered the arguments of counsel. 
Being advised in the premises, the court determined that at the 
EXHIBIT 
(!. 
time it entered a Decree of Divorce in this matter, July 14, 
1986, it was the intention of the court to equally divide the 
marital estate of the parties and the belief of the court was 
that it had done so; however, there had been significant changes 
of circumstances which rendered that division ineffective* The 
plaintiff has had a pattern for many years of being paid a sub-
stantial bonus in February or March of each year based on the 
earnings of his employer for the prior year. Following that pat-
tern, the court divided equally the bonus due in 1986 based upon 
the earnings in 1985, entered a judgment in paragraph 7 of the 
Decree which required payment by the plaintiff to the defendant 
of $27,750,00 plus interest, required the payment of alimony to 
the defendant in paragraph 8 of the Decree and for attorney's 
fees in paragraph 10 of the Decree, In 1986, plaintiff's 
employer received insufficient income and plaintiff did not 
receive a bonus in 1987. As a result, this court determined on 
April 1, 1987, to reduce all of the sums that were due to the 
plaintiff to judgment in the amount of $43,314.46 and stayed exe-
cution on that judgment until the plaintiff's situation became 
more clear. The plaintiff was terminated from his employment in 
July of 1987 as the business entity for which he worked was pur-
chased by Zions UtahBank Corp who merged that entity into its own 
operations and released the plaintiff as there was no further 
need for his services. The plaintiff sold the home of the 
-2-
par t ies in Utah County which had been valued by the court at the 
time of the divorce a t $150,000.00 for a gross se l l ing pr ice of 
approximately $124,000.00 and a net se l l ing pr ice of approxi-
mately $119,000.00 which wi l l produce a net proceed of sa le of 
approximately $20,000.00, as opposed to the $50,000.00 -
$60,000.00 the court believed would be produced by the sa le of 
that property. In addi t ion , the defendant, between the time of 
the t r i a l of t h i s matter on January 14, 1986, and the entry of 
the Findings of Fact , Conclusions of Law and Decree on July 14, 
1986, went to the bank where the pa r t i e s had stored the i r s i l v e r -
ware and removed tha t si lverware from the safety deposit box. 
The p l a in t i f f believed tha t the silverware was worth $10,000.00 
while the defendant believed that i t was worth approximately 
$4,500.00. These circumstances in the opinion of the court con-
s t i t u t e a subs t an t i a l change of circumstance in tha t the in ten t 
of the court has been thwarted by events resu l t ing in the defen-
dant being awarded more than one-half of the mar i ta l es ta te which 
requi res , in equi ty , a modification of the Decree and pr ior 
orders and judgments of the court which, even af ter the modifica-
t ion , r e s u l t s , the court be l i eves , in the defendant being awarded 
more than one-half of the e s t a t e of the p a r t i e s , thus, the court 
must modify the Decree of Divorce and prior orders and judgments 
of th i s court to provide tha t the defendant be awarded the s i l -
verware tha t she has removed from the bank deposit box and taken 
- 3 -
into her possession and the net proceeds of sale of the home of 
the parties and that upon payment to her of the net proceeds of 
salef that all prior awards, judgments and orders of the court 
requiring payment to her should be deemed satisfied and paid in 
full and all financial obligations of the plaintiff to the defen-
dant be deemed satisfied. 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The Decree of Divorce and all prior orders and 
judgments of this court which require financial payments by the 
plaintiff to the defendant shall be deemed satisfied and paid in 
full upon the payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the 
net proceeds of sale of the parties1 home in Pleasant Grove, 
Utah. 
2. The defendant is awarded all right, title and 
interest of the parties to the silverware that she has removed 
from the safety deposit box of the parties during the pendency of 
the action. 
3. Upon the completion of the payment envisioned in 
paragraph 1 above, the plaintiff shall have met all of his finan-
cial obligations to the defendant and all obligations as herein 
ordered in the Decree of Divorce and the orders and judgments of 
this court shall be deemed satisfied and the defendant shall sign 
any document necessary to, as a matter of record, declare that 
these obligations have been satisfied. 
-4-
4. Each party should pay their own costs and 
attorney's fees as incurred herein. 
DATED this ~}_ day of Qj2^_ , 1987. 
SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS REFLECTING 
THE RULINGS OF THE COURT: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CRAIG M. PETERSON 
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SARA A. JENSE, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CIVIL NO, D-85-702 
After due consideration of the Objection to the form of the 
Order in this case, and to defendant's Motion for a Trial, along 
with the pleadings that have been filed in connection therewith, 
and my review of the notes in this case, I am of the view that 
the marital estate was equitably distributed. In fact the 
defendant received more than half of the total estate. 
Consequently, the Objection will be overruled, and the Motion 
denied. I have signed the proposed Order as of December 7, 1987. 
Dated this * day of December, 1987. 
CA^jJ^ £ 
SCOTT DANIELS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CtJtffc 
EXHIBIT Q 
JENSE V. JENSE PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following, 
this ^ day of December, 1987: 
David S. Dolowitz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
185 S. State, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Craig M. Peterson 
Attorney for Defendant 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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